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INTRODUCTION

An ideological split has come to dominate contemporary debate
about the nature and scope of the Fourth Amendment right of privacy.'
Civil libertarians view privacy from government as a critically important
entitlement that must be guarded even-and perhaps especially-when
invoked by criminal defendants. Proponents of strong crime control, by
contrast, care more about protecting the public's security from crime
than about protecting the privacy of criminals.2 Accordingly, they urge a
less vigilant approach to privacy when it comes at a cost to criminal law
enforcement.3
In spite of their differences, however, the competing approaches
share the view that the Fourth Amendment privacy right is a matter of
individual entitlement. 4 In other words, the Fourth Amendment gives
every person an individual right to be free from "unreasonable
searches." 5
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
I use the phrase "right of privacy" to refer to "[tihe right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches." Id.; see also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (discussing the Fourth Amendment in
terms of reasonable expectations of privacy). Although the Fourth Amendment does not
use the word "privacy" explicitly, it is apparent that privacy concerns animate the right
against unreasonable searches. Even a textualist like Justice Black does not deny this
proposition but instead claims that the scope of this Fourth Amendment right ought to be
limited to the items listed in the text. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
2. For a discussion of the two models, see Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction 153-73 (1986) (describing the "crime control" and "due process"
models of criminaljustice);John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L.
Rev. 1027, 1027-28 (1974) (crediting Packer with recognition of the "crime control" and
"due process" models).
3. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "one hears the complaint, nowadays, that the Fourth Amendment
has become constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the career criminal (through
the exclusionary rule) often and directly, but the ordinary citizen remotely if at all"). But
cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (Scalia, J.) (asserting that "the Constitution
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all").
4. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) ("Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."); see also
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978) (quoting Alderman); Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223, 230 (1973) (same).
5. This Article focuses almost entirely on the right against "unreasonable searches" as
defined through the requirement of pre-search evidence on the part of the state. The
right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the right not to be subjected to police
conduct that is shocking because of its cruelty or invasiveness, see, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753 (1985); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), will remain largely outside the
scope of this discussion. This Article will also not attempt to analyze the so-called probable
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Most individual rights provisions of the Constitution protect the freedom to engage in conduct or to make choices.6 Civil libertarians would
allow people to exercise such rights until the point at which their exercise
causes harm to other people,7 whose rights must also be respected.8 For
example, an individual has a constitutionally protected interest in the use
and enjoyment of her property, 9 but that right does not protect her
property to the extent that it creates a nuisance.1 0
Unlike that of most personal rights, however, the outer boundary of
the Fourth Amendment privacy right does not coincide with the point at
which one's privacy begins to hurt other people's interests (by concealing
evidence of a crime, for example). Instead, the right ends when the state
comes to have evidence that the privacy is hurting others' interests. In the
conventional account, it is the government's state of knowledgeprobable cause, reasonable suspicion, "reasonableness"-that mediates
the question when the individual has a right not to have a particular
search take place. Some government searches are unconstitutional, then,
because the government lacked knowledge before the fact that would
have provided a legitimate motive for the search."' This feature of the
cause and warrant requirements. These requirements together represent one approach to
ensuring that police acquire sufficient information prior to performing searches. The
purpose of this Article is instead to clarify the relationship between the government's
failure to acquire such information, regardless of what such acquisition might entail (i.e.,
probable cause, warrant, probable cause and warrant, or general reasonableness), and the
individual's personal entitlement to privacy.
6. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I (protecting "freedom of speech" and "free exercise"
of religion); see also Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46
Stan. L. Rev. 235, 265-66 (1994) (distinguishing between protected primary conduct and
procedural rights).
7. The concept of harm is, of course, quite complex; the question of which detriments
to others ought to count as "harms" is therefore subject to debate. See Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-25 (1992) (arguing generally that "the
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' [land use] regulation is
often in the eye of the beholder" and specifically that "[o]ne could say that imposing a
servitude on [petitioner's] land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it from
'harming' South Carolina's ecological resources; or, instead, in order to achieve the
'benefits' of an ecological preserve").
8. See Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) in Louis R. Beres, The
United States and Nuclear Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurisprudential View, 12
Dick.J. Int'l L. 327, 332 n.13 (1994) ("Liberty is the capacity to do anything that does no
harm to others. Hence the only limitations on the individual's exercise of his natural
rights are those which ensure the enjoyment of these same rights to all other individuals.").
9. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014.
10. See id. at 1022.
11. By using the term "motive," I do not intend to suggest that courts are, or ought to
be, engaging in a subjective inquiry into officers' true motives. On the contrary, I propose
that it is the objective lack of adequate pre-search information that tells us that something
else-some inappropriate motive-is filling in the gap between the officer's prior
evidence and her decision to search. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text
(discussing the scope of the justiciable targeting harm as an objective rather than a
subjective inquiry). It is still the case, however, that it is the officer's access to pre-search
information and not the existence of such information somewhere in the world that
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privacy right is somewhat paradoxical: the factors that determine
whether a person possesses the right in a particular case lie largely
outside the person who owns the right. It is thus an individual right, the
scope of which is defined by a matter extrinsic to the individual and his
or her conduct and culpability: what the government knows.
This distinction between Fourth Amendment privacy and other constitutional rights may seem merely semantic. The state, after all, can
never act on a problem of which it is unaware. What distinguishes the
Fourth Amendment, however, is that the state's knowledge alone appears to
define the boundaries of the right. This is not true for most other constitutional entitlements. The right to free speech, for example, does not
include the right to incite a riot, even if the government never learns of
the riot.12 Although the state cannot without evidence prosecute or punish someone for incitement, this prohibition is a feature of due process
and the right to a jury trial, not of the right to free speech.
By contrast, we understand everyone to retain her right to privacy
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as the state does
not acquire enough knowledge of criminal activity to invade that privacy.
In an important sense, then, the process is the right.
There is more to the story, however, than what the government
knows. People feel differently about guilty versus innocent holders of
Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The right is not entirely independent
of what a person does with it. All of us begin with an entitlement to
privacy, but some seem by their actions to forfeit part of that entitlement.
The idea of forfeiture captures the intuition that guilty people really do
not deserve the right when its exercise consists of the concealment of
incriminating evidence. 13
renders a search valid. If, for example, one officer sees a perpetrator pulling a body into a
house but keeps his knowledge a secret, then another officer who knows nothing about the
body and decides nonetheless to search the house performs an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment. To that extent, the "state of mind" inquiry attached to a probable
cause determination focuses on what the particular officer knew of the suspect's activities.
An officer, of course, may conduct a search on the basis of a radio communication from a
different officer who himself has probable cause, even when the searching officer lacks
personal knowledge of the facts justifying the search. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560, 568 (1971). This allowance, however, is consistent with the proposition that only a
state actor who has personal access to information justifying the search (whether directly
or indirectly) may perform such a search. See id. at 565 n.8 (explaining that "an otherwise
insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony concerning information
possessed by the affiant when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing
magistrate").
12. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (discussing the distinction
between incitement and permissible speech).
13. I agree with Akhil Amar that the intuitions of ordinary people about the
circumstances under which a person is entitled to privacy from a search ought not to be
ignored. See Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757,
761 (1994). George Thomas and Barry Pollack would give voice directly to those intuitions
by letting a pretrial jury decide whether a search was reasonable. See George C. Thomas
III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy. A Societal View of the Fourth
HeinOnline -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1459 1996
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The intuition that those who conceal evidence of crime forfeit the
privacy used in such concealment is one shared by prominent liberals
and conservatives alike. Chief Justice Earl Warren, for example, argued
that an individual who uses her home as a "commercial center to which
outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business" forfeits any reasonable, home-based expectation of privacy that would serve
to protect the business. 14 Though the Supreme Court ordinarily considers the home a sacred place within the hierarchy of Fourth Amendment
privacy, 15 ChiefJustice Warren explained that a home used for an illegal
business "is entitled to no greater sanctity than if [the business] were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street."16 Similarly, Chief
Justice Warren Burger believed that an individual who uses his garden to
grow illicit drugs has no reasonable expectation of privacy from at least
some inspections of that garden.' 7 Once again, an individual may forfeit
the privacy that normally obtains in an area associated with the home I8 by
using that area to conduct and conceal criminal activity.
Moreover, if a government official knows that an individual is using
her privacy to commit crimes and to hide evidence of those crimes, the
official is legally entitled to a warrant authorizing a search of the individual's premises. By committing a crime, the individual in effect creates the
circumstances that may ultimately relieve the government of its obligation to respect her privacy. The forfeiture idea is accordingly one way of
expressing the reality that Fourth Amendment privacy is not limitless: its
limits are theoretically dictated by the lawful or unlawful nature of the
uses to which one puts one's private spaces.
There is thus a continuing philosophical clash between the intuition
that all "the people" hold a collective entitlement to governmental compliance with the Fourth Amendment and the competing intuition that
the guilty forfeit part of their privacy. This clash is evident in the wideAmendment, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 147, 150 (1993) (proposing that a small jury panel sit in
grand jury style to rule on reasonableness of a search, with the judge deciding whether to
impose the exclusionary rule if the search is found to be unreasonable). Of course, people
will not all share the same intuitions about a given issue, including the right of privacy. I
believe, however, that the intuition that the Fourth Amendment right of privacy belongs to
everyone, but that innocence is not entirely irrelevant to this right, iscommon enough to
be familiar to the reader, even if the reader does not individually share the intuition.
14. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
15. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980) (finding arrest warrant
mandatory for home arrest); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970) (contrasting
reduced expectations of privacy in a car to greater expectations of privacy in a home).
16. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211.
17. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (discussing aerial
inspections).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987) (explaining the
contours of privacy accorded the curtilage); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-79
(1984) (contrasting the open field with the curtilage).
HeinOnline -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1460 1996
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spread public debate over the exclusionary rule. 19 That debate, in turn,
brings to light a discomfort with permitting the guilty, the "undeserving,"
to benefit from the inevitable consequences of what the Fourth
Amendment does indeed appear to give everyone.
Few would challenge the contention that the guilty have Fourth
Amendment rights in some form. They do. However, to the extent that
privacy in one's "person[ ], houses, papers and effects" is a substantive
right that is intimately connected to the individual and how he or she is
using that right, the guilty seem undeserving, even unworthy, of the privacy they have abused, much like the hypothetical person who uses a
20
speech to incite a riot.
This Article challenges the prevailing discourse about the Fourth
Amendment. That discourse compels a choice between procedure and
substance in interpreting the right to be free from unreasonable
searches. I examine the importance of both the procedural and the
substantive features of the Fourth Amendment.
The dominant and purely procedural model of the Fourth
Amendment falls to capture the substantive significance of the
Amendment and hence relegates innocence to the status of an irrelevancy. An alternative and recently emerging substantive model of the
Fourth Amendment approaches innocence as the only factor worth considering. This model fails to answer the procedural command of the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, neither model recognizes the tension inherent in the Amendment, and each misses half of its dual significance.
Supreme Court jurisprudence has done little to resolve this tension.
While the Court has adhered in theory to the dominant procedural
model in most Fourth Amendment cases, it has also shown an affinity for
the alternative model, at times choosing to highlight one or the other
feature of the right without acknowledging the tension and what that tension might signify.
19. Compare Another Search-And-Seizure Loophole, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1995, at 18
(opposing exceptions to the exclusionary rule); Michael Garmer, GOP Clueless on

Democracy, USA Today, Mar. 28, 1995, at 13A (criticizing Republican opposition to the
exclusionary rule as unwarranted); Gerald Goldstein, Rule Deters Overzealous Law

Officers, Dallas Morning News, Apr. 17, 1995, at 11A (opposing the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule); and Cynthia Tucker, As I See It, Bill Of Rights' "Technicalities"

Protect Us All, S.F. Chron., Sept. 11, 1995, at 21A (defending limits on police powerhowever unpopular with citizens frustrated with crime-as preferable to the alternative)
with HaroldJ. Rothwax, Guilty: The Collapse of CriminalJustice 41-42 (1996) (arguing
against the exclusionary rule on the basis of text and history); Peter Reinharz, Rule of Law
The Court New York Criminals Love, Wall St.J., Jan. 31, 1996, at A15 (characterizing the

exclusionary rule, as developed by liberal judges, as all-purpose protection for criminals);
and Roger Simon, Exclusionary Rule Is Aimed at Procedure, Not the Truth, Baltimore

Sun, July 6, 1994, at 2A (explaining public disenchantment with the exclusionary rule as a
result of its tendency to leave criminals free to continue criminal activity).
20. As I explain below, the guilty do not lose all entitlement to privacy but only that

privacy which conceals their wrongdoing. See infra text accompanying notes 112-114.
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This Article presents a model of Fourth Amendment freedom from
unreasonable searches that integrates the competing qualities of the right
and explains why both civil libertarian and crime-control oriented intuitions are valid: the Fourth Amendment is a right of the innocent 1 and
of the guilty, 22 but it is not exactly the same right for both.
I call the dominant model of the Fourth Amendment the Formalist
model. This model conceives of the prohibition against baseless searches
as a means of protecting all persons with respect to whom the police lack
adequate suspicion, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the particular
searchee. The Formalist position accordingly fails to acknowledge any
distinction between the ex ante state of knowledge that public officials
must have in order to perform a search, on the one hand, and the ex post
state of affairs that requiring such knowledge is an attempt to approximate, on the other. The major consequence of this approach, for purposes of this discussion, is that it equates violations of the privacy rights of
23
the innocent with violations of those of the guilty.
21. When I speak of the innocent, I refer to those who are factually innocent of both
criminal activity and the concealment of evidence of criminal activity. Although all
criminal defendants benefit procedurally from an evidentiary presumption of innocence,
that presumption does not mean that such defendants are actually "innocent" until
convicted. The presumption ensures that the government meets a high standard of proof,
but it does not define the actual culpability of the defendant. Conversely, a person who is
convicted of a crime but who is in fact innocent does not become "guilty" at the point of
conviction. It is accordingly neither a logical nor a factual contradiction to speak of guilty
people who have not (yet or ultimately) been convicted of any offense, on the one hand,
and of innocent people who have been convicted, on the other. Factfinders are fallible
and therefore do not always know whether a defendant is guilty or innocent. That
fallibility, however, does not preclude a theory of benefits and burdens to which those who
are actually innocent or guilty are ideally suited. In short, I reject the radical skeptic's view
of the universe, in which facts do not exist apart from a factfinder's construction of them.
See generally Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 5-6 (1996) (contrasting such a view"anti-realism"-under which there are no actual facts in the real world apart from human
perception and description, with "realism," an approach that posits a reality that
transcends our perceptions and which we might therefore accurately or inaccurately
understand and describe).
22. When I speak of the guilty, I refer to those who are guilty of criminal activity and
of concealment of evidence of that criminal activity. If they are guilty of crime but have no
evidence on their person or in their possession, then there is no reason to interfere with
their privacy directly by searching them. See infra text accompanying notes 112-114
(discussing the scope of the privacy forfeited by the guilty). I also wish to emphasize that,
like Akhil Amar, "I do not here challenge or betray the defendant's legal presumption of
innocence and its doctrinal entailments." Amar, supra note 13, at 797 n.144. In other
words, I am not suggesting that everyone on whom evidence is found is guilty but instead
positing that those who are in fact guilty and are in fact concealing evidence (the "guilty")
are distinct from those who do not fall into this category.
23. Candidates for the title of Fourth Amendment "Formalist" would include a
number of distinguished Supreme Court Justices and scholars who have, respectively,
carried out and supported the Supreme Court's development of modem doctrine
governing the Fourth Amendment and other criminal procedure protections. Justice
Brennan strongly advocated the position that the Fourth Amendment guarantees criminals
apprehended through its violation the right to have the evidence suppressed (rather than
HeinOnline -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1462 1996
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The alternative Innocence model, by contrast, holds that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches is to protect only those who are innocent and are not concealing
evidence of crime from official searches. Under this model, a search that
reveals nothing incriminating is very different from a search that uncovers evidence of crime: the latter search, however unreasonable from an
ex ante perspective, is not that much of a Fourth Amendment harm,
24
though it may literally violate the Fourth Amendment.
considering the failure to detect the guilty an incidental side effect of a right belonging to
the innocent). See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that exclusion "'gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him'" (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961))). He
would therefore be likely to agree with the proposition that the guilty and innocent are
situated identically with respect to the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches. Justice Marshall might also fall into the category of Formalists. See Tracey
Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 Cornell
L. Rev. 723 (1992) (praisingJustice Marshall's resistance to the notion that the interest in
controlling criminal activity ought to play a role in construing the Fourth Amendment).
Yale Kamisar would also (and proudly, I expect) join the ranks of Fourth Amendment
Formalists who argue that innocence is irrelevant to the right to privacy. See, e.g., Yale
Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor
Grano, 23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 537, 560-69 (1990) (maintaining that the exclusionary
rule is necessary to prevent contamination of the judicial process by police illegality and
thereby dismissing implicitly the taint of the judicial process occasioned by disregarding
evidence of private crime); Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1987) [hereinafter Kamisar,
Comparative Reprehensibility] (dismissing explicitly the argument that failure to punish a
criminal as a consequence of suppression taints the judicial conscience).
I do not intend here to provide an exhaustive list of people who inhabit the "Formalist
camp," but only to give the reader a concrete sense of the influential role of the Formalist
approach to innocence in Fourth Amendment judicial and scholarly discourse. As I refer
throughout this Article to Formalists or to a given Formalist, I mean to invoke the
approach I describe in the text rather than any specific judge's or scholar's individual way
of handling Fourth Amendment questions.
24. Arnold Loewy develops a version of the Innocence model. See Arnold H. Loewy,
The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229,
1229 (1983) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect the innocent
alone, and only incidentally provides cover for the concealment of evidence); see also
WilliamJ. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 766, 780-82
(1989) (describing the Supreme Court's approach to Fourth Amendment searches as
reflecting a desire to protect not all privacy but only "law-abiding privacy," and posing
illustrative hypothetical case). Akhil Amar suggests that at common law a strong version of
the Innocence model governed:
Even if a constable had no warrant, and only weak or subjective grounds for
believing someone to be a felon or some item to be contraband or stolen goods,
the constable could seize the suspected person or thing. The constable acted at
his peril. If wrong, he could be held liable in a damage action. But if he merely
played a hunch and proved right-if the suspect was a felon, or the goods were
stolen or contraband-this ex post success apparently was a complete defense.
Amar, supra note 13, at 767.
Amar's theory is supported by early American case law: "At common law, any person
may at his peril, seize for a forfeiture to the government; and if the government adopt his
seizure, and the property is condemned, he will be completely justified .... " Gelston v.
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In interpreting the Fourth Amendment, I propose what I call the
Innocence plus Targeting model. This model contends that the Fourth
Amendment takes account of two distinct types of harm. The first harm,
the "privacy harm," is the substantive deprivation of privacy that is suffered when an individual's private space is scrutinized by the government.
The second harm, the targeting harm, is the procedural indignity that is
suffered when the government singles out an individual for a privacy invasion without a sufficient evidentiary foundation.
Under the Innocence plus Targeting model, the core purpose of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches is to prevent searches of innocent people who are concealing nothing while, to
the extent possible, preserving the feasibility of searches of guilty people
concealing evidence of crime. From the standpoint of core Fourth
Amendment values, then, when an unreasonable search occurs, only the
innocent victim experiences a substantive wrong, the privacy harm.
What distinguishes the Innocence plus Targeting model from the
Innocence model is that the former identifies an additional, secondary
purpose to the prohibition against unreasonable searches: treating the
individual fairly and not utilizing available discretion to target her for
unfavorable treatment without a legitimate basis. From the perspective of
this "targeting" concern, anyone who is singled out and searched without
adequate pre-search justification is harmed, regardless of his guilt or innocence. Like the Formalist model, the Innocence plus Targeting approach recognizes all unreasonable searches as creating Fourth
Amendment harms. The Innocence model is incomplete because it neglects the harm that stems entirely from government targeting rather
than from individual entitlement. To distinguish this harm from the privacy harm, which is unique to innocent people, I refer to it as the "targeting harm."
A model that takes account of both harms achieves a necessary synthesis between the focus of Formalists-governmental culpability-and
the focus of Innocence model proponents-innocent-individual loss of
privacy. It demonstrates how both of these constitute actual, albeit different, injuries to the individual.
In elaborating the Innocence plus Targeting model, I draw on constitutional text, history, doctrine, and moral reasoning.2 5 Because the
Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246,310 (1818) (StoryJ.) (quoted in Amar, supra note 14, at 767
n.30). It is also borne out by at least one English common law treatise:
And where a Man arrests another, who is actually guilty of the Crime for which he

is arrested, it seems, That he needs not in justifying it, set forth any special Cause

of his Suspicion, but may say in general, that the Party feloniously did such a Fact,

for which he arrested him.
2 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 77 (Professional Books Ltd. 1973)
(1721) (footnote omitted) (quoted in Amar, supra note 14, at 767 n.30).

25. Cf. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 12-13 (1991) (identifying, inter
alia, the historical, textual, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential modalities of constitutional
law); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
HeinOnline -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1464 1996
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Fourth Amendment contains the inherently open-ended term "unreasonable," the moral inquiry assumes a central role in my theory. The inquiry
proceeds through an analysis of several related hypothetical cases that
invite the reader to consult her intuitions about privacy and justice. 26
Part I of this Article examines in detail the Formalist and Innocence
models of the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches.
Part II offers the Innocence plus Targeting model as an alternative conception of the right at issue. It presents the strengths of the Innocence
plus Targeting model, provides analogies to other areas of the law, and

explains why the privacy right can be forfeited while the anti-targeting
right ought to be inalienable. Part III advances a critical evaluation of

existing doctrine and its tendency to confound the privacy and targeting
harms and thereby obscure the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part IV examines some of the consequences of the Innocence plus
Targeting model for practical Fourth Amendment problems. The
Innocence plus Targeting model does not resolve definitively the controversial question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule ought
to be retained. 2 7 It does, however, offer a clearer picture than competing
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L Rev. 1189, 1189-91 (1987) (developing a similar typology of
constitutional legal argument).
26. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 16 (1993) (asking the reader to
consult her intuitions about whether Frankenstein's Monster would have had legally
cognizable interests prior to Dr. Frankenstein's throwing the switch and analogizing to
status of a fetus); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution
112-17 (1991) (describing method as standard part of law school instruction and
alternatively as common law method).
27. The exclusionary rule continues to have its defenders. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an
"Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565 (1983) (defending the exclusionary
rule as following necessarily from Fourth Amendment principles rather than relying
primarily on the rule's efficacy as a deterrent of police misconduct); Tracey Maclin, When
the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1994)
(critiquing Amar, supra note 13); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First
Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820 (1994) (defending the exclusionary rule as the only
reliable vehicle for enforcing compliance with the Fourth Amendment, given the modem
scope of the criminal justice system). Its detractors, too, continue to voice their opinions.
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 13 (arguing, inter alia, that the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment doctrine flies in the face of the Amendment's text and history and that the
Court's current requirements-probable cause, warrant, exclusion-are accordingly
misconceived and should be replaced by a reasonableness standard coupled with a civil
remedy for victims); Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule:
An Application of Restitutive Principles ofJustice, 32 Emory LJ. 937 (1983) (defending
restitution as superior alternative to exclusion for victims of police misconduct); Richard
A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 Wash.
L. Rev. 635, 638-41 (1982) (arguing that from economic standpoint, exclusionary rule
produces deadweight loss by suppressing evidence and creates too much deterrence by
imposing a cost on government that exceeds the social cost of police misconduct). Finally,
there are those interested in a compromise position in which some but not all evidence
found as a consequence of illegal activity must be suppressed. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note
3, at 1046-49 (advocating application of the exclusionary rule to trials for all but the most
serious criminal offenses); Thomas & Pollack, supra note 13 (arguing for severing the
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models of what is at stake in attempting to answer this and other
28
questions.
I.

FORMALIST AND INNOCENCE MODELS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

This Part's first section describes the Formalist model of the Fourth

Amendment right of privacy. It first develops a series of hypothetical
police searches to critique the model. These scenarios illustrate why a

theory that fails to take into account the behavior of the individual rightsholder in evaluating her claim of privacy is incomplete and counterintuitive. To bolster the arguments elaborated through the search scenarios,
the section then develops a set of hypothetical cases in two areas outside
of criminal procedure: substantive criminal law and torts.
The second section describes the Innocence model, the current theoretical alternative to Formalism. Through further discussion and
elaboration of the earlier hypothetical search scenarios, this section defends the Innocence model. It then examines the relationship between
the doctrine of First Amendment overbreadth and the use of the exclusionary rule under an Innocence model approach. Section B concludes
by demonstrating that the history of the Fourth Amendment is consistent
with the Innocence model.
A.

Fourth Amendment Formalism

Formalism represents the leading school of thought about the
Fourth Amendment. This model is not characterized by any distinct
approach to the quantum of evidence or the state interest that is necessary as a condition for a legal investigation. It is, instead, characterized by
its refusal to identify or articulate any continuum of privacy entitlement
that turns on the conduct of the claimant. For the Formalist, the privacy
right is defined solely by reference to the government's state of knowledge
and justification prior to a search. 29 If, for example, the Fourth Amenddetermination that the Fourth Amendment has been violated from the decision to impose
exclusion as a remedy in a particular case).
28. I address the question of exclusion throughout this Article, because its character
as either part of the Constitution or as one possible remedy for the violation of the Fourth
Amendment implicates both the content of Fourth Amendment law and remedies
questions.
29. In Hohfeldian terms, we might say that for the Formalist, the key feature of the
Fourth Amendment is the duty it places on the government, and individual Fourth
Amendment privacy rights arise entirely as correlatives of the government's duties. See
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning
35-37 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1964) (describing the relation between rights and duties). But
cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 233, 236-41, 245-46, 257-60 (1991) (criticizing oneJustice's appeal to the
Hohfeldian paradigm in attempting to decide when a petitioner who would have
benefitted from governmental compliance with a regulation ought to be able to sue the
government for its failure to comply, a question better resolved by resort to the distinction
between intended and incidental beneficiaries of a governmental duty).
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ment requires that a police officer have probable cause and a warrant to
perform a search, then the individual has the right to privacy against state
searches to the extent that a police officer lacks either one. The behavior
of the individual-her guilt or innocence, her use of putatively "private"
space-is irrelevant. Indeed, anything that lies outside the scope of the
state's "mens rea," or state of mind, in performing a search is immaterial
to the privacy entitlement of the person searched.
Whether the Fourth Amendment right is defined by original intent,
textual reference, or doctrinal development, any violation of the right is a
constitutional infringement that constitutes a cognizable harm. The set
of parties injured by unreasonable searches thus consists of all persons
searched without the appropriate level of pre-search knowledge on the
part of the relevant public official. Accordingly, when the public official
has the requisite prior knowledge, there is no violation of the right of
privacy and no constitutional harm. Focusing as it does solely on governmental conduct, the Formalist model lacks a vision of the ideal Fourth
Amendment beneficiary, a vision that would permit the Formalist to identify the costs and unintended benefits of violating the letter of the law in a
given case.
Formalists assert that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
prevent governmental overreaching so that every individual, regardless of
what she has done, may feel security and freedom from governmental
intrusion.3 0 It is, of course, not perse formalistic to focus upon the importance of governmental compliance with the law.3 ' In explaining the
meaning of "overreaching," however, it is necessary to articulate some
rationale for the contours of the right that explains why the government's
acquisition of something like "probable cause" does and ought to define
the difference between the legal and the illegal search.
The Fourth Amendment privacy right does not place an absolute bar
on government searches. The limits placed on the right announce a
competing value that will not be completely subordinated to individual
privacy. This competing value, efficacious criminal investigation, con30. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
Minn. L. Rev. 349, 367 (1974) (explaining that from the perspective of the Amendment as
"a regulation of governmental conduct," the Fourth Amendment is "essentially a
regulatory canon requiring government to order its law enforcement procedures in a
fashion that keeps us collectively secure in our persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures"). Amsterdam argues in favor of this regulatory
conception, asserting that "the fourth amendment may require the police to promulgate

and observe written rules governing certain aspects of their activities" and that although
one could explain such a requirement in terms of safeguarding individuals' particular
spheres of Fourth Amendment rights, "it would find a firmer footing in the... conception
of the amendment as a general command to government to respect the collective security

of the people in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." Id. at 372.
31. Indeed, the targeting harm that I describe below, see infra notes 88-97 and
accompanying text, turns entirely on governmental culpability and not at all on an
individual's private conduct.
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cerns ferreting out 2 actual criminals and actual evidence of crime so that
the state may punish the perpetrators. The government derives no benefit from performing a search "upon probable cause" that fails to further
the process of bringing a criminal tojustice. Conversely, in the individual
case where a search must be foregone because it cannot be justified by
pre-search evidence, the goal is not to provide privacy to all and only
those individuals about whom the police have no evidentiary basis for
suspicion. The compromise between absolute privacy and absolute governmental authority to search that is apparent in the Fourth Amendment
reflects instead a value placed on the privacy associated with those about
whom there is no cause for suspicion (those who seem innocent) and a
coordinate value placed on the power of the government to investigate
those about whom there is cause for suspicion (those who appear guilty).
The failure of the Formalist model to link the limits of Fourth
Amendment privacy with the criminal activities that generate these limits
makes the model conceptually unsatisfying. Put differently, the model
fails to explain some general intuitions about privacy and law enforcement. To illustrate these intuitions (or perhaps provoke them in the
reader), I will describe a series of hypothetical cases, accompanied by the
approach the Formalist model would take to each of them.
1. Paradigm Cases to Question Formalism. - Consider the following
cases. A and B each separately commits the crime of murder against persons similarly situated with respect to A and B. After committing their
crimes, A and B drag their respective victims home in garbage bags and
hide the bodies in foyer closets, near the doors to their houses. A, however, does one thing differently from B. A sprays the leading brand of
room deodorizer near the body every evening and thereby manages to
disguise the smell of the decaying corpse. B uses a cheaper but less effective room deodorizer, and the smell of the decaying corpse wafts through
the house and beyond.
A police officer patrolling the neighborhood smells the odor emanating from B's house as she walks by one evening. She immediately contacts the magistrate on call with a cellular phone and obtains a telephonic
search warrant via her cellular facsimile machine. The warrant is predicated on probable cause, provided by the police officer, to believe that
the victim of a homicide is concealed in the home of B. The officer
knocks on B's door and announces her intentions. Upon B's letting her
into the house, the officer steps inside, opens the foyer closet and sees
the corpse. B's fingerprints are ultimately found to be all over the body;
the physical evidence is overwhelming.
While all this is happening to B, A feels confident that his crime will
never be discovered, because he sprayed the more effective room deodorizer. However, he turns out to be wrong. As a different police officer
32. Law enforcement officers are said to be "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1193 (1995).
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walks by A's house, she decides that she would like to look around inside.
She is not exactly sure why, but she has a bad feeling about A. He wears
his hair in a ponytail, and he has a bumper sticker on his car that says
"Pro-life? Then act like it!" She does not like this fellow, and she is going
to have a look around.
She knocks on the door. A opens it and asks what the problem is.
She walks past him and begins her search, opening the foyer closet door.
Upon seeing the corpse, she stops, shocked, and proceeds to arrest A.
The evidence in A's foyer closet overwhelmingly proves that he, like B, is
guilty of murder.
Consider the similarities and differences between A and B from their
own perspective. Each committed murder. Each used his private space
to conceal evidence of murder. These are the similarities. A, however,
sprayed an effective room deodorizer around his victim. B sprayed an
ineffective room deodorizer around his. That is the difference. It is true
that from the perspective of a police officer walking by the house prior to
performing a search, the distinct smell meant that there was a major difference between these two individuals: probable cause to believe B but
not A was concealing evidence of murder. Therefore, the first officer
behaved properly with respect to B, and the second officer behaved culpably with respect to A.
But what did B do to deserve less privacy than A? Spraying a less
effective room deodorizer is not a morally relevant act. Both A and B
attempted to conceal evidence of their wrongdoing by hiding bodies and
by spraying room deodorizers. These are the morally relevant acts, and
they do not distinguish between the two men. 3 3 The difference between
33. The two alternative ways of conceptualizing the difference between A and B"the same for purposes of entitlement" versus "completely different for purposes of the
government's authority"-correspond roughly with Charles Nesson's alternative
characterizations ofjury verdicts. See Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On
Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv.L. Rev. 1357 (1985). The finding
of guilt in a criminal trial, explains Nesson, can carry the meaning that the defendant did
the criminal act and will pay the penalty. Alternatively, the verdict can carry the meaning
that corresponds with the government's authority by emphasizing that a person will be
convicted and punished only if the evidence enables proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The first characterization-the legal rule-will encourage law-abiding behavior. The
second-the proof rule-will encourage action that will avoid successful proof of guilt.
The purpose of the criminal law will be undermined if the second characterization comes
to represent society's view of the meaning of verdicts. See id. at 1357-63. By analogy, the
primary purpose of prohibiting searches where an officer lacks evidence of wrongdoing is
to protect the privacy of law-abiding individuals. The rule that an officer must obtain
probable cause before searching, for example, is a proof rule in the service of a legal rule
about the security of law-abiding citizens. To place an emphasis on this proof rule and to
say, accordingly, thatA is entitled to privacy because the officer lacks proof of wrongdoing,
is to miss the primary meaning of the right against unreasonable searches and to transform
lawlessness accompanied by effective concealment into a state of legal entitlement.
Meir Dan-Cohen similarly conceptualizes the divide between what we require of the
police and what we hope these requirements will provide in the way of benefits to the
general public. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
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them is that A was better at the concealment. Under any moral theory of
an individual's right to privacy in his closet, B was just as entitled or unentitled to the continued exercise of the right as A. Judging from the actual
behavior of A and B rather than from the information obtained about
their conduct by the police officers prior to their searches, there is no
material difference between the two individuals searched.
The Formalist would deny this equivalence. For the Formalist,3 4 A
had a right to privacy, and B did not, because the officer lacked probable
cause to search A but had probable cause to search B. The officer therefore harmed A but not B, and A but not B experienced the violation of a
right that had in no way been forfeited or abused. Under the Formalist
model, there is all the difference in the world between A and B.
Now add a third party to the hypothetical case. C has the misfortune
of smelling like a decomposing corpse. He uses a personal deodorant
and room deodorizer to disguise the smell, but they are the same brand
as the room deodorizer used by B and they are not very effective. As a
result of the smell that consequently emerges from C's home, a passing
police officer becomes alarmed and acquires a search warrant in the
same manner as the officer who searched B. After entering C's house,
the officer first opens the foyer closet but finds only one item, C's
pornographic videotape, adjudicated not to be obscene in the relevant
community. The officer then proceeds to the main part of the house but
realizes as she does so that the smell grows fainter when she moves away
from C and stronger when she approaches C. She asks C for an explanaSeparation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 627 (1984) (analyzing the relationship
and discontinuity between "conduct rules," rules that delineate prohibited conduct, and
"decision rules," rules that direct the nature and scope of governmental regulation of those
who violate the conduct rules). In the cases of both the privacy right and the criminal law,
there is not a precise fit between the underlying purpose and the manner in which that
purpose is effectuated. On the theory that A and B are entitled to the same treatment,

innocent people are supposed to feel secure as long as they conform their behavior to the
law; guilty people are accordingly supposed to feel insecure in the privacy that they used to
conceal wrongdoing, because like the criminal whose conduct is deserving of punishment
(under the theory of the "conduct rule"), they have forfeited the entitlement to be left
alone by the government. Yet the government must perform only reasonable searches
(those that are justified from the perspective of the rules governing public officials).
Therefore, those who do nothing wrong but attract police attention through innocent but
suspicious-looking behavior will feel insecure, and criminals who are effective at concealing
all evidence of wrongdoing will feel secure. Similarly, the criminal who is either willing to
"do the time" as a tax on otherwise personally desirable behavior, or to prevent the
government from learning of his criminal act and from acquiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, defies the purpose of the criminal law. In the context of both the
Fourth Amendment and substantive criminal law, however, the rules governing the state
are designed to control crime and protect the innocent, rather than simply to control
evident crime or to protect the apparently innocent.
34. The following discussion assumes that the Formalist believes that probable cause
and a warrant are required for the search of a home. One can, however, substitute readily
for probable cause and a warrant whatever a particular Formalist considers the
requirements for a valid home search.
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tion, and he promptly produces a letter from his doctor explaining his
"dead-body odor" condition. The officer chuckles and then apologizes to
C and leaves his house.
If one had to classify the conduct of the officers in the three cases,
one would probably say that the officer who searched A's home acted
culpably in a way that the other two officers did not. Shifting our attention from the officers to the people searched, let us consider how we
might classify the three searchees, A, B, and C. My intuitions (and I suspect most people's) lead to the conclusion that C is less like either A or B
than A and B are like each other. C, unlike A and B, has committed no
offense and has concealed no evidence of crime. C, unlike A and B, has
in no way abused his right of privacy with respect to his closet.
The Formalist, however, will say that C and B are alike and that A is
different. In the cases of both C and B, a police officer searched a person's home on probable cause and with a warrant. In neither case did
the officer violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, in neither case
was there a Fourth Amendment harm. By contrast, the police officer
violated A's right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. A is
the only victim of the three. The intuition that C (the odoriferous one)
deserved more privacy than B, even though there was probable cause in
both cases, and the intuition that C deserved more privacy than A (the
one who sprayed the effective deodorizer), even though it is A and not C
who was searched without probable cause, are completely unacknowledged under the Formalist model.
Why do many of us have these intuitions about guilt, the concealment of evidence, and the Fourth Amendment right of privacy that conflict with the Formalist model and with the doctrinal requirements of the
Fourth Amendment? Despite any discomfort that we might have with the
result, most of us would still agree that the Formalist's reaction to the
hypothetical cases coincides with the Fourth Amendment's specifications.
Yet many among us would be (perhaps secretly) glad that A was searched
and discovered to be a murderer, and most would also be unhappy that C
was searched.
If we could avoid the precedent inevitably set by condoning the
search of A, given the lack of ex ante information indicating that he was
concealing anything incriminating, or the precedent inevitably set by requiring the police officer to ignore the sort of smell emerging from C's
home, we might happily permit A to be searched and C to be ignored in
these particularcases.
Our potential comfort with the search of A and discomfort with the
search of C, moreover, do not stem from some sentimental infatuation
with the innocent, wholly disconnected from Fourth Amendment values.
Instead, the intuitions behind this willingness conform to at least one set
of Fourth Amendment values better than a strict and unquestioning adherence to the literal requirements of that Amendment.
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The Fourth Amendment tells us that searches must not be performed unless they are "reasonable." To be reasonable, a search must
generally be justified by the prior acquisition of some quantum of evidence that makes it likely that the search will uncover further evidence of
wrongdoing. It follows that the Fourth Amendment requirement that
searches be reasonable is in part an attempt to maximize the number of
searches that are performed against people concealing evidence while
minimizing the number of searches conducted against persons concealing nothing.
The search that discloses evidence is, in other words, the "ideal"
search under the Fourth Amendment, and the search that discloses nothing is the "worst case" search against which the prohibition of
unreasonable searches is designed to guard. Therefore, when the officer
in our hypothetical case searched A, she performed the "ideal" search
under the Fourth Amendment, the kind of search that "reasonableness"
or "probable cause" is supposed to maximize.
The problem with the search of A was therefore not a problem with
this search but with the risk created by the ex ante state of mind of the
police officer performing the search. Lacking the requisite level ofjustified suspicion, the willingness to perform this search will tend to result in
many searches of innocent persons concealing nothing; it will tend to
maximize the "worst case" search, which will be most of the searches performed without ex antejustification.
Conversely, the search of C (the odoriferous one) is the "worst case"
search from an ex post perspective. It invades an innocent person's privacy without furthering the goals of criminal law enforcement.35 C suffered an invasion of his private space and the accompanying insecurity
and embarrassment against which the Fourth Amendment is designed to
protect. In addition, no evidence was discovered.
In balancing privacy against the need for effective law enforcement,
a balance implicit in a power to search that is constrained by pre-search
knowledge of crime on the part of the state, the search of C is an unambiguous harm. Nonetheless, there is no violation of the letter of the
Fourth Amendment: requiring an officer to forego the search of C, given
the information that the officer had before entering C's home, would
result in neglect of the officer's responsibilities-responsibilities that are
recognized as legitimate by the Fourth Amendment's failure to adopt an
35. Of course, the search of an innocent person who is suspected of crime will

sometimes assist the police in locating the true offender by eliminating one suspectjust as
a preliminary search of one location can eliminate or confirm police suspicions and result
in their avoiding unproductive searches and pursuing only productive searches. Cf.

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542-43 (1988) (holding that where there is an
illegal (warrantless) preliminary search of a location and a subsequent search of the same

location pursuant to a warrant, the fruits of the latter search must generally be suppressed
where the initial illegal search narrowed down the warrants that would be sought by
eliminating suspects and, accordingly, places to be searched).
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absolute prohibition against searches. In other words, the likelihood of
encountering evidence in C's case is sufficiently high, ex ante, that requiring the officer not to search C's home would reduce the number of ideal
searches by too great a number.
The paradigm cases of A, B, and C teach us that there is tension
inherent in the Fourth Amendment between the rule and its applications. On the one hand, the requirement that searches be reasonable
maximizes desired outcomes over time. On the other hand, there are
specific applications of the rule that are themselves undesirable when
considered against the purpose of the rule. The Formalist's failure to
acknowledge this tension tends to undermine respect for the Fourth
Amendment and may account for public disenchantment with this portion of the Bill of Rights, a portion that sometimes makes a murderer's
home his castle. Recognition of this tension-that the search of A is basically beneficial and the search of C basically unfortunate-would be an
in restoring moral coherence to the Fourth
important step
36
Amendment.
2. Analogiesrom Substantive CriminalLaw and Torts. - A brief survey
of some paradigm cases from outside the criminal procedure context will
help illustrate the tension between the Fourth Amendment rule and its
applications. Consider first a hypothetical example from substantive
criminal law. Imagine thatJane Doe takes a registered firearm from her
gun rack, walks over to the bedroom window of her fifth-story apartment,
closes her eyes, and fires in a downward direction toward the crowded
street below. Imagine further that the bullet fired from the gun hits P. P,
as it turns out, was holding a gun to the head of the President of the
United States and was himself about to shoot his target. Jane Doe's shot,
however, prevents this assassination plan from coming to fruition and
saves the President's life by killing P.
Based upon her behavior (from her point of view), we would certainly regard Jane Doe as either a criminal3 7 or dangerously mentally ill.
36. To the extent that one does not consider crime control an important concern in
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, one would likely disagree with the positions
articulated here (both that the search of A is basically good and that the failure to say so
compromises the moral coherence of the Fourth Amendment). This Article assumes that
crime control is important (in part because the need to control crime is implicitly
acknowledged in the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against only unreasonable rather
than all searches) and therefore finds unsatisfactory any theory of the Fourth Amendment
that takes no account of this interest in assessing the quality of A's Fourth Amendment
claims.
87. The Model Penal Code says that for ajustification defense to apply, the act to be
justified must be one which "the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm to himself
or to another." Model Penal Code § 3.05 (1985). The defense of "protection of another"
accordingly requires a corresponding belief in the necessity of intervention. Id. Most
states' criminal codes apply an objective "reasonable belief" test but otherwise track the
Model Penal Code. See Wayne R. LaFave &Austin W. ScottJr., Criminal Law § 5.8, at 463
(2d ed. 1986). Therefore, one must be aware of the facts manifesting the necessity of one's
action in order to believe (subjectively or reasonably) that such action was necessary.
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Either way, she probably should be removed from free society, through
either incarceration or civil commitment.38 P, however, the victim of
Jane Doe's shooting, is not in a very good position to complain about
being shot (and not just because he is now dead).
Ps actions made killing him at that moment ajustifiable act. IfJane
Doe had known the facts, then her shooting P deliberately would have
been blameless. In legal terms, she would have committed justifiable
homicide in defense of another. Jane's behavior, considered from her
perspective, is wrong only because shooting randomly out a window into
the street will rarely turn out to accomplish a positive result. It will generally create a significant risk that someone will be hit, and when that risk is
realized, the result will almost always be injury or death that is unjustified,
even considered ex post. The harm in her act, in other words, lies in the
risk that her willingness to shoot into the street poses to people other
than P, people who should not be shot.
In the abstract, then, what Jane did is harmful. However, viewed
from the perspective of what P was actually doing at the time, Jane's act
was legally, and arguably morally, justified. Jane Doe is accordingly like
the officer who searched A's home. Jane Doe is culpable and her act was
likely to cause harm. In this instance, however, her act resulted in a benefit. Indeed, it resulted in the kind of benefit acknowledged and contemplated by the law prohibiting her conduct in the first place, through the
creation of an exception to the prohibition when this outcome is intended ex ante by the actor.
Turn now from criminal law to torts for an additional illustration.
Probable cause or Fourth Amendment reasonableness may be compared
usefully to the principle of unreasonable risk in the law of negligence 8 9
Since the decision in PalsgrafV. Long Island R.R, the modern law of negligence has required a plaintiff to prove the following: that the defendant
acted in a way that created a foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff; that
the risk was realized because of this action; and that the plaintiff was consequently injured.4 0 Of course, just about every risk is foreseeable at
some level, and no activity (or inactivity) is risk-free. To be negligent,
however, is to create an unreasonably high risk of injury, with reasonableBecause Jane Doe was unaware of the facts that necessitated her action, the homicide
justification of "protection of another" is unavailable to her.
38. See generally Sherry F. CoIb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right
Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 781, 824 (noting that "there is a
compelling interest in protecting citizens from violence and the threat of violence").
39. As Akhil Amar observes, the Fourth Amendment's "global command that all
government searches and seizures be reasonable sounds not in criminal law, but in
constitutional tort law." Amar, supra note 13, at 758. Though Amar makes this
observation as part of an argument that the Fourth Amendment is not primarily concerned
with criminal law enforcement, my appeal to tort law is premised not on this argument but
instead on the analogous structure of both the mental state and injury components of
negligence and the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches.
40. 162 N.E. 99, 99-100 (N.Y. 1928).
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ness contingent on a balancing of the burden of injuries and their likelihood of occurring against the benefits created by the defendant's
41
actions.
Thus, if a defendant acts in a way that is very likely to injure someone, for example by driving at twice the speed limit, but somehow does
not injure anyone and instead saves someone's life by shielding a man
lying on a park bench from a flying tree branch that bounces off the
speeding car, then the harm sought to be avoided by the negligence rule
was avoided. This was the "ideal case" envisioned by the negligence rule.
In other words, the avoidance of injury is the purpose of the negligence
rule, and in this case injury was avoided not in spite of but because of the
negligent conduct. The conduct was nonetheless negligent-culpable
and irresponsible-because it was very likely to lead to injury. Absent
actual harm, however, no liability attaches.
The converse of this negligence scenario is the non-negligent actor:
the driver who obeys the traffic laws and drives carefully, but nonetheless
hits and kills a child on roller skates who suddenly bolts in front of the car
from inside an apartment building lobby. Here, the driver is in no way
culpable. He has obeyed the rules, which are designed to minimize injury. Yet the outcome in this specific case is contrary to the purposes of
negligence law: this is the "worst case," sought to be avoided by constraints around the driver's conduct.
The driver in the first scenario is, in the long run, more likely to
cause harm than the driver in the second scenario, and those likelihoods
make the first and not the second driver culpable. Yet we are much more
displeased by the events in the second scenario than we are by the events
in the first scenario, in which the speeding driver saved a life. We experience these reactions, which are in tension with the culpability states of
the respective actors, much in the way that we might have been pleased
with the search of A (the effective deodorizer) and displeased with the
search of C (the odoriferous man). Our reactions in both cases are
guided by the disparity between the odds-which drive the rule-and the
unlikely events that actually took place.
The main harm, then, of searches that are unlikely to yield evidence-searches not based on adequate information-is not the low likelihood in the particular case but the consequence of that low likelihood:
the invasion of the privacy of innocent persons who are not concealing
evidence. 42 As in the law of negligence in torts, the police can be "negli41. See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned

Hand, J.) (explaining that "[plossibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability

depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL).
42. William Stuntz relies on this mode of reasoning in attempting to make sense of
the Supreme Court's approach to waiver in the context of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights. See Stuntz, supra note 24, at 779-83. Specifically, Stuntz describes the
Supreme Court's approach to Fourth Amendment rights as reflecting the view that "the
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gent" with no harmful result in terms of privacy-that is the case of Aand the police can exercise reasonable care and nonetheless cause injury-that is the case of C. This is simply a consequence of our imperfect
knowledge of the universe and our imperfect ability to predict when, in
the individual case, there will or will not be an injury if people act in a
particular way.
This lack of fit between the rule and some specific applications that
we see in the negligence area is more pronounced in the context of the
Fourth Amendment. This is so because there is no doctrinal vehicle for
taking into account the difference between harmful and beneficial results
in the particular case as there is in the negligence context (where there is
no liability absent harm). Existing remedies for Fourth Amendment
violations turn entirely on the culpability of the state actor and not at all
on harm. Indeed, in the case of the exclusionary rule, the availability of
the remedy requires a beneficial result-the obtaining of evidence of
crime-and a remedy is unavailable in the worst case scenario in which
an innocent person harboring no evidence of criminal conduct is
searched.
B.

The Innocence Model

There is an alternative model of the Fourth Amendment that responds to these intuitions about harm and thus considers A (effective
deodorizer) and B (ineffective deodorizer) to be equally situated with
respect to their Fourth Amendment entitlements. This model deems injury to have occurred when and only when the innocent are searched. I
43
will refer to this model as the Innocence model.
Under the Innocence model, the guilty person concealing evidence
who is able to avoid detection because of the Fourth Amendment right of
privacy is a cost and not an intended beneficiary of that right of privacy.
He is a known cost, because in striking a "reasonableness" balance that
prohibits many searches, the Fourth Amendment has the inevitable consequence of allowing some criminals to avoid being discovered. Similarly,
the search of some innocent people hiding nothing is an inevitable confourth amendment protects not all privacy but rather law-abiding privacy only." Id. at 780.
He illustrates the distinction between the two through a hypothetical case in which an
officer searches a closed suitcase without probable cause and the suitcase turns out to be
filled with cocaine. Under his analysis:
It follows that a police officer's decision ... causes no "fourth amendment injury"
to the suitcase's owner.... The search does cause some harm cognizable under
the fourth amendment, but that harm consists of the diminished security that
innocent suitcase owners feel in a world in which police officers are free to open
suitcases at will.
Id.
43. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 24, at 1229 (developing a version of the Innocence
model); Stuntz, supra note 24, at 786 (explaining the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment precedents as reflecting a model that turns on the value of privacy for lawabiding behavior alone).
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sequence of striking a balance that permits searches to take place without
absolute certainty that something illegal is being concealed. Although
the search of C is allowed, it nonetheless represents a Fourth Amendment
"harm" under this model, and although the search of A is not allowed, it
nonetheless represents a Fourth Amendment gain. The state of mind of
the officer who performs the search of A's home without prior knowledge
to justify the search is problematic not in relation to this particular
searchee, A, but because it is likely eventually to victimize innocent
people.
Under the Innocence model, the Fourth Amendment restriction on
searches is concerned exclusively with protecting the innocent from invasions of privacy.44 The requirement of probable cause is simply a rough
way of achieving this goal while permitting evidence-gathering to take
place. Probable cause is thus an imperfect proxy for ensuring that the
official will find evidence concealed on the person or property of any
individual searched. If there were some method of ensuring this outcome without requiring the officer to have particular knowledge prior to
the search, that method might be equally acceptable. If, for example,
officials could search wherever they felt like searching, but some magnetic field-without their knowledge-prevented them from wanting to
search in places where there was no evidence, then the lack of probable
cause or justification for a search might seem largely irrelevant.4 5
44. See Loewy, supra note 24, at 1229 (asserting that "the primary purpose of [the
Fourth Amendment] is to protect the innocent").
45. Along similar lines, Arnold Loewy describes a hypothetical "divining rod" that
would guide the police to perform only productive searches:
In a Utopian society, each policeman would be equipped with an evidencedetecting divining rod. He would walk up and down the streets and whenever the
divining rod detected evidence of crime, it would locate the evidence. First, it
would single out the house, then it would point to the room, then the drawer,
and finally the evidence itself. Thus, all evidence of crime would be uncovered in
the most efficient possible manner, and no innocent person would be subject to a
search. In a real society (such as ours), the fourth amendment serves as an
imperfect divining rod.
Loewy, supra note 24, at 1244.
I choose the magnetic field metaphor, rather than that of the divining rod, because
the police officer who knows the divining rod will lead her to the evidence has not acted
"unreasonably," even from her own perspective. By contrast, the police officer who simply
searches wherever he pleases (without realizing that the magnetic field will block his will to
search places housing no evidence) is still behaving "unreasonably" and therefore
resembles the officer in A's hypothetical case above (deodorizing murderer) who is
misbehaving and yet does not cause a privacy harm.
Along related lines, a recent student Note observes that advances in computer
technology permit us to consider an actual "perfect search" instrument taking the form of
a "Net-wide search" that would detect only those computer files the possession of which is
illegal, such as digital videos of child pornography. See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace,
General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide
Search, 105 Yale L.J. 1093, 1093-97 (1996). Adler correctly points out that the Court's
jurisprudence of how the Fourth Amendment is triggered would find no fault with such an
investigative tool. See id. at 1106-08 (discussing the holdings in United States v. Place, 462
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An example of an acceptable search without individualized probable
cause occurred in United States v. Jones.46 In that case, postal inspectors
discovered that a postal employee was stealing certified checks from the
mail. To determine who was committing this offense, they organized a
sting operation. The inspectors planted an electronic monitor and certified check inside an envelope that would pass through the post office
where the checks had been stolen. The monitor would reveal to the inspectors its own location (and therefore the location of the envelope into
which it was placed) at a given time. The hope was that the thief would
strike again and steal the planted envelope, thereby revealing himself and
his (as well as the envelope's) whereabouts to the postal inspectors.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
the use of this monitoring device did not violate the Fourth Amendment
rights of Jones, who was ultimately found with the stolen envelope and
arrested. 47 The court held that monitoring the whereabouts of the envelope was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
because no one had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whereabouts of the envelope. Therefore, the court reasoned, there was no need
for individualized suspicion or probable cause to justify the investigative
activity. This reasoning, although consistent with existing doctrine, was
not the only available means of disposing of this case-nor was it the best.
The judges in the majority48 may have felt constrained by Fourth
Amendment doctrine: if they had deemed the monitoring a search, it
would have followed that the inspectors needed individualized probable
cause and a warrant for the investigation to take place. In other words,
the judges may have believed that there was no Fourth Amendment violation but may have seen no vehicle for expressing that view other than
through a holding that the investigation did not constitute a search at all.
What the judges may have failed to recognize in their own belief that the
monitoring was legal is that this belief probably derived in part from (1)
the fact that the person complaining of the Fourth Amendment violation-Jones-was monitored only because he had stolen the certified
check envelope into which the monitor had been placed and (2) the fact
U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (finding that a dog sniff of luggage does not constitute a search
because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in concealing whether or not one's
luggage contains narcotics, the only fact disclosed by the dog sniff) and United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a field test of white powder legally seized
does not constitute a search because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
concealing whether one's white powder is or is not cocaine)).
46. 31 F.3d 1304 (4th Cir. 1994). Although the facts here provide an example of what
might be the "perfect search" under a model that takes innocence into account, the court
did not decide the case on this theory (which after all is not currently the legal standard for
evaluating police activity under the Fourth Amendment).
47. See id. at 1311.
48. Judge Faber wrote the opinion of the court in which Judge Hall joined, and Chief
Judge Ervin wrote an opinion concurring in part but dissenting from the determination
that the use of the electronic device was not asearch. SeeJnes,31 F.3d at 1316-17 (Ervin,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that the monitoring device was the least invasive and the most precise way
to determine who had stolen the envelope.
Even if the court had considered it invasive to detect the location of
a particular article of mail, and therefore had held that monitoring an
envelope in a person's possession generally is a search regulated by the
Fourth Amendment, the search of Jones should still be legal because it
was based on something better than individualized probable cause: the
practical guarantee (rather than mere probability) inherent in the investigative vehicle that only the guilty person concealing evidence of crime
and that only to the extent necessary to discover eviwould be searched, 49
dence of the crime.
Without the monitor, the inspectors probably would have lacked
probable cause to look through Jones's car. 50 The inspection at issue in
this case, however, involved the determination of where the envelope had
been taken and would therefore affect only the person who illegally took
possession of that envelope and would reveal only where the envelope
(which should not have been removed from the mails) was taken. Such
precision in the scope of a search is the aim (though better than the
reality) of the probable cause requirement.
Had the court decided Jones on this alternative ground, it would have
upheld an obviously legitimate sting operation without opening the door
to monitoring the whereabouts of the private possessions of innocent persons, an unfortunate consequence of holding that placement of a monitor in an envelope does not constitute a search. 51 The Innocence model,
in this example, gives coherence to the notion that someone like Jones
49. Note that there was an outside chance that someone would steal the envelope and
then plant it on someone else. This, however, was exceedingly unlikely to occur, given that
the envelopes were not marked as containing a monitor.
50. The Postal Inspectors knew only that Jones had been the mail driver on prior
occasions when deposited envelopes had disappeared and that on this occasion he had
taken longer than usual to balance his truck. See Jones, 31 F.d at 1310.
51. See also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (police use of electronic
tracking device to follow defendants' travel in an automobile to a hidden drug laboratory
upheld as constitutional because a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements over the public streets, which are observable by anyone who wants to look).
But see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1984) (holding that continuous
monitoring of defendant's home for three days by means of an electronic tracking device
constituted a search because it revealed "a critical fact about the interior of the premises
that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not otherwise
have obtained without a warrant"). TheJanes court distinguished Karo on the grounds that
in Karo, agents placed the monitoring device on private property, so the surveillance was
an intrusion into an item in which Karo had a legitimate privacy interest. Jones, by
contrast, had no privacy interest in the stolen envelope. SeeJones, 31 F.d at 1310-12. Of
course, Jones did have a privacy interest beneath the driver's seat of his car, the place
where the monitor was ultimately found. One might plausibly object to the monitoring of
someone situated similarly to Jones, if he were innocent. One example might be the
government's attachment of monitors to publicly-placed flyers advertising abortions in
order to record the whereabouts of people who pick up such flyers. Although the flyer is
located originally in a public place and does not belong to the person searched, it
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lacks a privacy interest in the location of the stolen mail, and it does so
withoutjeopardizingJones's legitimate privacy interests or the privacy interests of innocent people who are otherwise similarly situated.
1. Innocence and Overbreadth. - In contrast to the unusual facts
presented in Jones, it usually is impossible for the government to confine
searches to the guilty and thereby protect only the innocent. Absent presearch information about a particular individual, it is ordinarily necessary
to grant privacy protection to everyone as a means of maximizing the
privacy of the innocent. Permitting police to justify their searches by reference to the evidence ultimately discovered would leave the innocent
vulnerable to invasions of their privacy.
This is why there is an affirmative case under the Innocence model
for allowing the guilty to litigate Fourth Amendment violations, in spite
of the undeserving character of such individuals. Such litigation takes
whose posthe form of the suppression motion, of which only people in
52
themselves.
avail
may
discovered
been
has
evidence
session
Under the Innocence model, the criminal defendant who invokes
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to suppress incriminating evidence against him is very much like the criminal defendant who invokes
the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine to dismiss the prosecution
against her.55 The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine permits a person whose conduct is not itself protected by the First Amendment to
and prohibits proavoid prosecution under a law that reaches too 5broadly
4
tected activity along with unprotected activity.
The concurring opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul provides a good
illustration of the resemblance between the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 55 In R.A.V.,
four Justices would have disposed of the criminal defendant's First
Amendment claim on overbreadth grounds.5 6 A white juvenile with the
ultimately becomes private property; more importantly, it reveals the private interests and
whereabouts of a person who has not engaged in any wrongdoing.
52. See infra Part IV.B.

53. See, e.g., RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 413 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring) (finding ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes
protected expressive conduct as well as unprotected fighting words); City of Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 455, 462-63 (1987) (invalidating Houston ordinance making it illegal to
"oppose, molest, or interrupt" a police officer in the performance of his duties because
"[t]he Houston ordinance... is not limited to fighting words nor even to obscene or
opprobrious language, but prohibits speech that 'in any manner . . . interrupt(s]' an
officer" (footnotes omitted)); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (striking down
statute prohibiting all forms of picketing, including peaceful picketing, as
unconstitutionally overbroad).
54. See Dorf, supra note 6, at 245 (analogizing overbreadth doctrine to Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule).
55. See R.A.Y, 505 U.S. at 397 (White, J., concurring).
56. Although the Court itself also struck down the law on First Amendment grounds,
it did so on the basis of the law's content discrimination rather than its overbreadth. See
id. at 383-86.
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initials R.A.V. burned a cross on the lawn of an African-American family.
He was prosecuted under a St. Paul, Minnesota criminal ordinance that
prohibited hate speech expressing5 7messages that degrade on the basis of
specified invidious classifications.
R.A.V. claimed that although cross-burning on a neighbor's property
is not itself protected by the First Amendment, the criminal ordinance
reached beyond acts of violence and vandalism to speech and symbolic
speech that are constitutionally protected. In other words, R.A.V. made
the claim that he could not be prosecuted under the Minnesota ordinance because the regulating rule was invalid: other persons whose conduct might not be so regulated were affected by that ordinance. The
ordinance violated the free speech of rights-bearing individuals and acapplied here to
cordingly had to be invalidated, even though it was being
58
otherwise regulable conduct, R.A.V.'s cross-burning.
Some might ask, why should there be an overbreadth doctrine in the
First Amendment area when those engaging in protected conduct have
not themselves been prosecuted? Some might similarly question the litigation of Fourth Amendment rights by the guilty through the exclusionary rule and wonder why the law should restore the defendant's privacy
when those deserving of privacy have not been searched in this instance.
The conventional answers to the two questions are similar.
Those persons who had planned to express themselves in constitutionally protected ways that were nonetheless prohibited by the St. Paul
ordinance might be chilled by the ordinance from doing so but probably
would not bother to bring lawsuits to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance against them. They would be more likely simply to refrain from
speaking. It is R.A.V. who has an incentive to complain about the potentially unconstitutional applications of the ordinance, because such a complaint might have the effect of preventing his prosecution. Similarly, the
defendant in the criminal case who might avoid conviction for his or her
crime by challenging the unconstitutional investigative conduct of the
government-A, for example-has a strong incentive to bring that challenge, a stronger incentive than the innocent (and deserving) persons
who generally suffer the violations of their privacy in silence. 59
57. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380.
58. See id. at 413 (WhiteJ, concurring) ("Although the ordinance as construed [by
the Minnesota courts] reaches categories of speech that are constitutionally unprotected, it
also criminalizes a substantial amount of expression that-however repugnant-is
shielded by the First Amendment.").
59. At least one set of findings suggests that victims of Fourth Amendment harms do
not generally seek civil remedies, and that those who do are ordinarily unsuccessful.
Between 1971 and 1986,
[p]laintiffs have filed an estimated 12,000 Bivens actions [i.e., lawsuits against
federal officials for violating the Constitution]. In only five cases have the
defendants actually paid damages, and it is not known whether any of these
involved illegal search and seizure. With respect to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the [Justice] Department's research discovered "fewer than three dozen reported
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The innocent person who is searched without probable cause is unlikely to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to try to recover for the violadon of his right to privacy. He probably would not recover very much
money, and the lawsuit would be potentially as intrusive as the search, if
private items were uncovered in the course of that search. The criminal
defendant thus functions as a private attorney general,60 ever-vigilant in
preventing government misconduct that would otherwise eventually
harm those the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect. He may be
a good surrogate for the real victims, because there is a payoff-albeit a
morally ambiguous one from the perspective of society-if he prevails.
2. Innocence and History. - We have seen that the Innocence model
is generally compatible with current Fourth Amendment doctrine, including the application of the exclusionary rule, even though this latter
benefit is unavailable to the innocent who are not in possession of any
incriminating evidence. We have also seen that the logic of the Fourth
Amendment text and shared normative intuitions provide support for the
Innocence model. Now let us examine the history of the Fourth
Amendment and assess the fit between the Innocence model and that
history.
There appears to be a consensus among historians of the Fourth
Amendment that the provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures was designed specifically to prevent the federal government from
employing search and seizure devices like the "general warrants" and
fourth amendment cases over the past 20 years." The Report identifies two
obvious reasons for the failure of civil plaintiffs to enforce the fourth amendment:
firstjuries sympathize with the police and not with criminals; second, search and
seizure activity, however unconstitutional, ordinarily does not cause the kind of
actual damages that our tort system compensates. With respect to internal
discipline, the Justice Department documents only seven investigations into
fourth amendment violations by its agents since 1981; none resulted in the
imposition of sanctions. The Department did obtain two criminal convictions for
violation of fourth amendment rights, but the defendants were subsequently
pardoned by the President.
Donald Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified
Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 591, 629 (1990)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Truth in
Criminal Justice Series, Report No. 2, Report to the Attorney General on the Search and
Seizure Exclusionary Rule (1986), reprinted in 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 573, 630 (1989)
(footnote omitted)); see also Richard Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental
Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 635, 638-39 (1982) (noting that losses
sustained by improperly searched individuals may in the aggregate be very large, but are
"too small to give any one person an incentive to sue" (footnote omitted)).
60. See Amar, supra note 13, at 796 (explaining that on deterrence theory of
exclusionary rule, criminal defendant acts as a "kind of private attorney general"); DanielJ.
Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and
Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 247, 249 (1988) (discussing
nature of the private attorney general idea that drives 'deterrent remedies" in the area of
criminal procedure). But cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 191 (4th ed. 1996) (raising questions about legitimacy of
judicial remedies to which complaining litigant is concededly not entitled).
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"writs of assistance" that were used by agents of the British Crown. 6 1 The
general warrant authorized its holder to "'seize, take hold and burn...
books, and things... offensive to the state.' "62 As its name suggests, the
general warrant was open-ended as to both the person to be searched
and the timing of any seizure. 63 The warrants were valid for the life of
the monarch under whose name they were issued.64 The writ of assistance was a specific form of the general warrant that was used by customs
officials to search for smuggled goods. Like the general warrant, the writ
also permitted its holder to search anyone during the life of the reigning
monarch. 65
61. Writs of assistance issued by the Crown were used primarily by British customs
agents to search and seize goods on which taxes had not been paid. These warrants
conferred the general power to search without the need to justify the search. See Nelson
B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution 28-35 (1937). The Fourth Amendment was a direct response to these
warrants and was intended to abolish the practice. See Telford Taylor, Two Studies in
Constitutional Interpretation 38-41 (1969). John Adams claimed that the "child
Independence was born" when James Otis made his argument against the legality of
general warrants. Editorial Note toJohn Adams, Petition of Lechmere, in 2 Legal Papers
ofJohn Adams 106, 107 (L. Kirvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). Though Otis lost
his case, the speech is considered to have had profound political effect on the drafting of
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 32
(D.D.C. 1974); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2398 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that blanket searches based on subjective and largely
unenforceable individualized suspicion were the evil at which Fourth Amendment was
aimed).
Akhil Amar disputes the centrality of the writs of assistance in forming the historical
backdrop against which the Fourth Amendment was framed. See Amar, supra note 13, at
772. Tracey Maclin takes a contrary stance. See Maclin, supra note 27, at 14-16 (arguing
that historical opposition to writs of assistance provides support for Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement). For purposes of this Article, the distinction between general
warrants and writs of assistance (and hence between the two approaches outlined in this
footnote) is not of great consequence. My discussion focuses on the nonspecific nature of
both the general warrants and the writs of assistance, without taking a position on the
implications of this history for the legitimacy of the warrant requirement. Moreover, it is
clear that warrantless searches based upon a standardless and undisciplined application of
police discretion would raise the same problems historically associated with the general
warrants and writs of assistance. For a second response to Amar's critique of the warrant
requirement (as well as Amar's critique in the same issue of the probable cause
requirement and the exclusionary rule), see Steiker, supra note 27, at 820.
62. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L Rev. 1865,
1369 (1983) (quotingJacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A
Study in Constitutional Interpretation 21 (1966)).
63. See id. (citing Landynski, supra note 62, at 21-22).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1370. The framers apparently viewed as evil and tyrannical both the
substantive goals underlying the warrants and their arbitrary procedural implementation.
Censorship of views critical of the government and the unilateral imposition of taxes and
other costs on trade contributed to the outrage felt by the English colonists. In the words
of James Otis, a prominent colonial-era lawyer in Massachusetts Bay Colony, this was
"[t]axation without representation." See Joseph Ricchezza, Are Undocumented Aliens
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Although the general warrant and writ of assistance were used in the
enforcement of civil rather than criminal laws,6 6 their connection to the
area of conduct against the government is apparent. The general warrants were used by the British Crown to identify and stop printers from
disseminating pamphlets critical of the government.6 7 The writs of assistance were used to curb the colonists' practice of smuggling goods and
thereby avoiding import taxes and other restrictions on trade. 68 Thus,
though the "wrongs" that the government attempted to address were civil
rather than criminal, they were also public rather than private. This is
the type of harm currently addressed principally by criminal as opposed
to tort law.6 9 Moreover, the search and seizure accompanying the use of
the warrants at that time resemble current forfeiture provisions associated with violations of the criminal law.70
The Innocence model is consistent with the need to address the
kinds of governmental abuses historically associated with the use of general warrants and writs of assistance in the pursuit of evidence against
perpetrators of perceived public wrongs. Under the Innocence model,
the essence of what makes a search wrongful is the innocence of the person searched. Since the government can only determine the innocence
or guilt of a person, ex ante, with particularized evidence, the general war"Persons" Within the Context of the Fourth Amendment?, 5 Geo. Immigr. LJ. 475, 478
n.17 (1991). Other portions of the Constitution were aimed more specifically at
addressing the substantive abuses. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I (protecting freedoms of
speech and press); id. art. I (establishing representative governing body).
66. See Stewart, supra note 62, at 1370.
67. See id. at 1369.
68. See id. at 1370.
69. As described in one influential text:
The distinction between them [tort and crime] lies in the interests affected and
the remedy afforded by the law. A crime is an offense against the public at large,
for which the state, as the representative of the public, will bring proceedings in
the form of a criminal prosecution. The purpose of such a proceeding is to
protect and vindicate the interests of the public as a whole, by punishing, by
eliminating the offender from society, either permanently or for a limited time,
by reforming or rehabilitating, by teaching the offender not to repeat the offense,
or by deterring others from similar conduct. ...The civil action for a tort, on the
other hand, is commenced and maintained by the injured person, and its primary
purpose is to compensate for the damage suffered, at the expense of the
wrongdoer.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984)
(foomotes omitted).
70. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.,
§ 1964(a) (1994) ("The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest,
direct or indirect, in any enterprise. .. ."). Convicted violators may also be prohibited

from engaging in the same type of enterprise in the future, their investments may be
reasonably restricted, or the enterprise may be dissolved (so long as its activities affect
interstate commerce, and the rights of innocent third parties with an interest in the
enterprise are protected). See id.
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rants and writs of assistance were offensive because they increased the
likelihood that innocent people who deserved to retain their privacy
would be searched. Put differently, the framers of the Fourth
Amendment were not opposed to the idea of searches for evidence of
wrongdoing. What they rejected was the use of search instruments too
blunt to distinguish those deserving of government scrutiny from the
large majority of individuals whose privacy should be preserved. With no
requirement of reasonableness or probable cause, officials are able to
search indiscriminately and are therefore likely to harm innocent people
much of the time.
Under the Innocence model, then, what is offensive about unrestrained governmental authority to search is not the discretion itself, but
the consequence of such discretion: the inability of innocent and lawabiding individuals to feel secure in the privacy of their persons, houses,
papers and effects. The Innocence model thus captures an important
and seizures
part of what was offensive to the framers about the searches
71
that inspired the creation of the Fourth Amendment.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE TO FoRMALIsM AND INNOCENCE: INNOCENCE
PLUS

TARGETING

This Part provides a critical analysis of the Innocence model and
concludes that it does not describe fully the values at stake in the prohibition against unreasonable searches. The Part begins with a discussion of
two hypothetical scenarios that would be classified as identical under the
Innocence model of the Fourth Amendment even though significant theoretical distinctions can be drawn. From these distinctions, the "targeting
harm" is identified as the piece missing from the Innocence model's
approach. The Innocence plus Targeting model and the utility of adding
the targeting component are elaborated through a discussion of Supreme
Court cases in the Fourth Amendment area as well as in the employment
discrimination context. This Part then defends the Innocence plus
Targeting model by returning to the overbreadth analogy and by demonstrating that the Innocence plus Targeting model is most consistent with
the historical background of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the Part
discusses the experience of suffering the targeting harm.
71. I qualify the statement as I do because the Innocence model obviously does not
account, nor does it attempt to account, for the opposition to censorship that was also an
important aspect of the framers' opposition to the general warrant. If censorship were the

only harm, however, then the First Amendment would have constituted an adequate
remedy. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518
(1970) (addressing the procedural protection that is a necessary feature of the substantive
right of free speech). The Fourth Amendment adds to the substantive right of free speech
a substantive right of privacy which, under the Innocence model, is concerned exclusively
with maximizing the extent to which the government searches the right (guilty) people, on
the implicit assumption that they are searching for evidence of legitimately proscribed

activity.
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The Missing Piece in the Innocence Model

The Innocence model, which conceives of the Fourth Amendment
as a provision dedicated to protecting the privacy of the innocent, is appealing. The model captures the widely-held intuition that someone like
A (effective deodorizer) is no more entitled to privacy than someone like
B (ineffective deodorizer), and that people like C (odoriferous one) are
casualties of the Fourth Amendment.72 When judges find it difficult to
feel much sympathy for the murderer who was caught because a police
officer had a "feeling" but nothing solid justifying the search that uncovered the crime, the Innocence model makes that difficulty coherent and
even laudable; furthermore, it does so as a matter of Fourth Amendment

values.
The Innocence model does, however, leave a part of the picture unexplained. The state of mind of the public official performing the search
does color the nature of a search so that the experience of the search is
qualitatively different when the official is motivated by something other
than evidence-based suspicion. The guilty searchee is thus not merely a
surrogate for the innocent in registering his complaints of official
wrongdoing.
Consider the following hypothetical case as an illustration. Z's home
is searched without probable cause. The search uncovers nothing that is
incriminating (though much that is embarrassing). Ys home is searched
with probable cause, but this search also uncovers nothing incriminating
(but again, much that is embarrassing). 7 3 Both Z and Y experience undeserved invasions of privacy. Each would have retained his privacy in the
ideal Fourth Amendment world, in which all productive searches and no
unproductive searches take place. Neither Z nor Y abused his private
space by concealing evidence there. Therefore, each deserved to retain
his privacy in that space.
Z (no probable cause), however, has been harmed more than Y
(probable cause). It is not simply that the officer's conduct with respect
to Z endangers more innocent people than the officer's conduct with
respect to Y. That danger-the abstract harm of creating a risk to innocent others-is not an individual injury to Z that would distinguish the
search of Z from Z's perspective. The additional harm to Z is that he is
left wondering, "Why me?74 Why have the police singled me out when
they lacked an evidentiary basis? Why didn't they search someone else

instead or as well? What gave them the gut feeling that I am a criminal?"
72. See supra Part I.A1.
73. Ys case is a less specific version of Cs case, described supra Part IA1.
74. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 9-6, at 605-07 (2d ed.
1988) (considering the harm of arbitrarily sacrificing the few to the many in the context of
takings clause jurisprudence, and alluding specifically to the question "Why me?" that is
posed by Fifth Amendment takings "from the perspective of the individual harmed").
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The harm that Z but not Y experiences is the targeting harm, the
harm of being singled out from others through an exercise of official
discretion that is not based on an adequate evidentiary foundation.
When the police decide to search Z, they are doing so because they find
something about Z suspicious. They are not searching everyone, nor are
they performing a random search of every nth person. Moreover, they
are not acting on an adequate evidentiary basis. 75 They are instead exercising discretion illegitimately to focus upon Z. It is this unfounded focus
that defines the targeting harm.
Unlike Z, Y has been singled out because of evidence-perhaps a
photograph of a perpetrator who looks almost exactly like Y. The police
are not out to get Y, they have acted reasonably toward him, but have
nonetheless needlessly (in retrospect) disturbed his privacy. Y has therefore suffered only a privacy harm within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, while Z has experienced both a privacy harm and a targeting harm. There are thus two distinct Fourth Amendment harms that
occur when an innocent person is searched without the requisite level of
pre-search evidence.
The Innocence plus Targeting model helps to identify the reason
that some unreasonable searches appear "bad" and others still worse,
even when the doctrine fails to address the underlying intuitions that
drive these judgments. The model holds that some unreasonable
searches implicate only one of the two Fourth Amendment search harms
while others implicate both.
The leading Supreme Court cases addressing the issues surrounding
a police officer's stop of a private vehicle elucidate the nature of the
targeting harm as a significant component of the Fourth Amendment. In
Teny v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that persons who appear to be
engaged in criminal activity may be stopped briefly by police without a
warrant or probable cause, based on reasonable suspicion. 76 After Terry
was decided, a number of other cases arose that tested the boundaries of
the "stop and frisk" doctrine as applied to stops of motor vehicles in
transit. In Delawarev. Prouse,an officer had some spare time and decided
to spend it by stopping the respondent's vehicle and "check[ing] the
driver's license and registration." 77 The Supreme Court held that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment, because he lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. 78 This seemed to follow from a straightforward
75. Doctrinally, this situation would mean that they lack probable cause (or a warrant
through which a neutral magistrate has recognized that there is probable cause).
However, if the standard were higher or lower, that would change not the nature of the
targeting harm, but only the point at which it would occur.
76. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that probable cause to arrest is not required for a
police officer to subject to a limited stop an individual the officer reasonably believes may
be engaged in illegal activity). The brief stops authorized by this case have come to be

known as "Terry stops."
77. 440 U.S. 648, 650 (1979).
78. See id. at 663.
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application of Teny, but the Court's specific reasoning branched out in a
new direction.
The Court stated that what was unconstitutional about the stop in
Prouse was that it singled out a particular individual without any special
reason to suspect him of driving without a license or registration. If instead of stopping one person, however, the officer had set up a checkpoint at which every person driving by would have to stop briefly, there
would have been no Fourth Amendment violation. 7 9 In other words, the
Court distinguished between two classes of cases where the tangible intrusions-the "seizures"-are physically indistinguishable from one another
and where the lack of pre-invasion information is also identical. The
on the basis of whether
Court nonetheless distinguished between them
80
targeted.
or
out
singled
was
seized
the person
The exercise of "unbridled discretion" to single out one individual
from others, where none has done anything to arouse suspicion, constitutes a distinct harm against the individual that was recognized by the
Court in Prouse.
The Fourth Amendment, as the Court explained, requires either
"less intrusion" (in terms of the substantive seizure harm) "or [methods]
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion."8 1 Where
intrusions are of a limited nature, as are Teny stops, the targeting feature
of the officer's conduct comes to occupy as significant a place in the doctrine as the intrusion itself. Where there is no targeting-as in regular82
ized stops at checkpoints-there is no Fourth Amendment violation.
79. See id. at 655-57, 663.
80. Then-Justice Rehnquist found this distinction bizarre and unconvincing. He
wrote that by drawing the distinction, "[tihe Court thus elevates the adage 'misery loves
company' to a novel role in Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence." Id. at 664 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
81. Id. at 663. The Court made a similar argument in the context of a challenged
random urinalysis requirement in a public school district's interscholastic athletics
program. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995). The majority,
upholding the drug policy, explained that contrary to the respondent's contention, a drugtesting program based on suspicion of drug use would not necessarily be less intrusive than
the challenged policy. The suspicion-based program might "transform[ the process into
a badge of shame" and therefore provoke opposition in parents who support the current
system. Id. Moreover, "[r]espondents' proposal [that only suspected drug users be tested]
brings the risk that teachers will impose testing arbitrarily upon troublesome but not druglikely students." Id. The Court here identified the targeting harm.
82. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (asserting that "[a]t traffic checkpoints the motorist
can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion [than a
driver subject to a random stop]" (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95
(1975), quoted in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976))); see also
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) (holding that "[t]he
intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional
purposes indistinguishable from the [border] checkpoint stops we upheld in [United
States v.]Martinez-Fuerte, [428 U.S. 543 (1976)]"). Though Prouseand Sitz are cases about
seizures-stops-there is nothing about the Court's analysis that would confine the
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Sometimes the presence of the targeting harm may not seem to coincide with the absence of justification for a given search. For example,
when the police officer stopped Prouse instead of some other driver, it
might have been because the officer was listening to a radio show about
the frequency of people driving without license and registration and decided at that moment to stop the next driver to pass by and ask for license
and registration. If this decision were made before any cars were in view,
it would seem as fair as stopping every tenth car at a checkpoint.8 3 There
is, in other words, no ex ante factor in the officer's decisionmaking process that renders a person having Prouse's attributes more vulnerable to a
stop than a person lacking these attributes. Therefore, the harm of being
singled out illegitimately might have been absent in the very case in
which the Court acknowledged it.
Moreover, some searches that are entirely justified in an evidentiary
sense are in fact motivated by illicit factors. If Prouse were speeding, for
example, but the officer had used the speeding as a pretext for stopping
him because of his "Reagan for President" bumper sticker, the officer
would seem to have engaged in illicit targeting. The targeting harm
would therefore appear almost indistinguishable from that visited upon a
nonspeeding Reagan supporter. Yet the definition of targeting presented
above does not include such pretextual activity: while the officer was not
motivated exclusively by the available evidence, that evidence was sufficient to sustain the stop. The definition of the targeting harm as the
illegitimate use of official discretion to single out an individual for an
intrusion without an adequate evidentiary foundation thus appears to be
both overinclusive and underinclusive.
This appearance, however, does not reflect a flaw in the definition of
the targeting category. It demonstrates instead the inevitable imprecision
of applying an objective standard to questions of targeting. As illustrated
below, the objective standard nonetheless remains the most effective
means of smoking out the targeting problem.
Consider again the officer who singled out Prouse for a stop without
any evidentiary justification. Though he might have made his decision
without reference to any fact about Prouse, this possibility is not the most
plausible explanation for the stop. It is more likely that something about
Prouse caused the officer to want to stop him, even if only subconsciously.
Even if the officer had decided to stop the next car to drive by, he might
have changed his mind and restrained himself upon seeing a car driven
by someone with different attributes (that might reflect race, class, gender or politics), much in the way that a person decides against approaching a particular pedestrian for directions after having resolved to ask the
targeting principle to this part of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the stop-as explained
in Teny-is often immediately followed by a "frisk," or limited search for weapons. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).

83. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663-64 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (extrapolating from the
reasoning of the majority opinion the legitimacy of stopping every tenth car).
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next passerby.
Though the Court did not identify a specific fact about Prouse that
might have motivated the officer, it spoke of the importance of an "objective standard" for police intrusions and described the exercise of "unconstrained discretion" as an "evil." 84 Rather than focus on the state of mind
of the officer, the Court chose instead to focus on the objective lack of
justification. It is this absence that suggests both to the Court and to the
typical individual that something particular to him accounted for the officer's decision to stop him. A person's perception that he has been
targeted is, of course, a critical element of what makes the targeting harm
damaging to him and therefore a cognizable harm under the Fourth
Amendment.
Conversely, the ready availability of a justification for a search provides good evidence for both the person searched and a court of law that
the search was legitimately motivated. As a general rule,8 5 it makes sense
to regard objectively justifiable searches as legitimately motivated as
well. 86 Pretextual searches should consequently not be actionable under
84. Id. at 661.
85. One important exception to such a rule would apply in the case of invidiously
motivated harassment. An example of such harassment might be the disproportionate
number of highway stops visited upon African-American drivers. See generally infra note
111 (citing various commentators who have discussed the racial factor in police decisions
about whom to stop).
86. It makes sense both because the government's possession of an objective
justification suggests as an evidentiary matter that the search was legitimately motivated
and because an individual subjective inquiry would be too costly to administer. There are
thus two levels at which I classify investigative activity relative to evidentiary justification:
first, there may be a legitimate reason of which the government is unaware (the case of A);
second, there may be a legitimate reason of which the government is aware (the case of B).
The first manifests the targeting harm, and the second does not. The second could be
conceptually divided into two parts: first, the case in which the government's actual reason
for the activity is the same as the known legitimate basis; second, the case in which the
government's actual reason is different from the known legitimate basis. I choose not to
divide the category of known justification in this way because improper subjective
motivation is usually very difficult to discern in a case in which a legitimate justification was
known to the actor. If an officer knows of facts that provide a legitimate justification for
his actions, it therefore seems appropriate in the context of the Fourth Amendment to
conclude that the known justification actually motivated the act.
For similar reasons, if a person kills a life-threatening attacker under circumstances in
which the intended victim knows that he must kill to save himself from the attacker, we
classify this act legally as self-defense even if the intended victim actually hates the attacker
and kills in anger. The criminal case of Bernhard Goetz provides a dramatic illustration of
this principle. In this case, a group of minority youths approached Goetz (a white man) in
a subway car and asked him to give them five dollars. He responded by shooting at the
men with his illegal firearm. See George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard
Goetz and the Law on Trial 1 (1988). Goetz was apparently motivated in the shooting by
racial prejudice (manifested at an earlier time by an intention, as he described it, to rid his
neighborhood of "spics and niggers," id. at 136) as well as a desire to kill the men who had
approached him. See id. at 17. Notwithstanding the apparent presence of an invidious
reason to commit the alleged crime, the judge nonetheless permitted Goetz to present the
defense ofjustifiable homicide on the grounds of self-defense. The fact that he was also
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the Fourth Amendment in most cases. 8 7
B.

Understandingthe Targeting Harm

How serious a harm is targeting? The two Fourth Amendment
harms-the privacy invasion and the targeting or singling out of an individual-are not equivalent.8 8 While Z (the innocent person searched
without probable cause) has suffered a meaningful harm that Y (the innocent person searched with probable cause) has not, there seems to be a
still greater difference between C, the innocent odoriferous man whose
closet is searched on probable cause, and B, the guilty murderer whose
closet is searched on probable cause. In other words, the right to privacy
(deserved by the innocent) is primary and the right not to be targeted
(deserved by everyone) is secondary. As an injunction against unreasonable searches rather than unreasonable conduct more generally, the
Fourth Amendment itself supports such a hierarchy. The ultimate desire
of those who framed the Fourth Amendment "was not that the government be reasonable but rather that the people be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects."8 9
Nonetheless, the targeting harm causes a substantial injury to the
person targeted, notwithstanding the fact that the harm originates in the
hidden thoughts of the police officer. An analogy from anti-discrimination law will help illustrate the way in which the targeting state of mind
on the part of an official transforms the nature of her conduct. In
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., petitioner, a 62-year-old woman who had worked for respondent as a secretary for 30 years, claimed
that she was fired because of her age. 90 After the lawsuit was filed, respondent employer discovered misconduct committed by petitioner that
would have led automatically to petitioner's discharge had it been known
to respondent beforehand. Respondent brought a summary judgment
motion, producing evidence of this misconduct and claiming that it vitiacting from racially prejudiced motivations did not lessen the exculpatory significance of
his belief that force was necessary to prevent the robbery.
87. As the Court explained in Whren v. United States, "'the fact that the officer does
not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal

justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'" 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996)
(quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). The Whren Court held that
when an officer has an objectively legitimate basis for stopping a vehicle, the stop is legal
under the Fourth Amendment regardless of the officer's actual subjective motivation for
the stop. See id. at 1775; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137-42 (1990)
(rejecting petitioner's contention that plain view seizure is invalid if discovery of item in
plain view was not inadvertent; given difficulty of determination, officer's subjective state of
mind is not a proper subject for inquiry).

88. Under existing doctrine, they approach equivalence only in the context of very
limited Fourth Amendment privacy invasions, such as the stop discussed in Prouse. See
supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
89. Adler, supra note 45, at 1120.
90. See 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
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ated petitioner's age-discrimination claim. The district court granted the
motion, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The theory was that an employee
who commits acts that would have led to her discharge had the acts been
known to the employer at the time of termination does not have a cause
of action for age discrimination, even if the employer in fact terminated
her because of her age.9 '
The court of appeals envisioned the right against discrimination as
inseparable from the employee's actual qualification for the particular
job she holds. It is therefore the right of an employee who is otherwise
deserving of herjob not to be mistreated or terminated because of her age.
If the employee has engaged in job-related misconduct, if she does not
"deserve" her job, then she may be fired for an invidious reason without
legal consequence. At some level, this result makes sense. How can petitioner claim that she should not have been fired if, in fact, she deserved
to be fired?92 The mistake would have been retaining her, not firing her.
It might have seemed logical to the court that a substandard employee
who is fired lacks moral "standing" to complain about her termination.
The complaining employee resembles the character A in our earlier
hypothetical case. Recall that A was concealing in his foyer closet the
body of the person he had murdered. An officer lacking any legitimate
reason to suspect A of wrongdoing nonetheless searched A's closet and
found the body. A did not deserve to be free of the search any more than
B (as to whom there was probable cause) did or any more than petitioner
McKennon deserved to keep herjob. The only problem with the search
of A and the termination of petitioner McKennon was the state of mind,
respectively, of the officer performing the search and the employer effecting the termination.
In spite of the force of these arguments, however, it would seem that
respondent employer committed a harm against petitioner McKennon
that stemmed from the interaction of the motive it had for terminating
her and the act of termination. Similarly, although less powerfully, we
have an intuition that the officer actually wronged A by searching him
because of his strange hair or his bumper sticker or whatever combination
of traits made her dislike A. The Supreme Court found accordingly and
held that petitioner had stated a cause of action for age discrimination
but that the scope of the remedy might depend on whether her misconduct rendered her independently deserving of termination. 93
Actors' motives thus transform the nature of the conduct that they
motivate. Being searched because one is "different" and being fired
because one is elderly are experiences that are qualitatively different from
91. See id. at 542-43.

92. What made the particular case rather bizarre is that the petitioner's "misconduct"
consisted of looking at the employer's confidential files about herself in order to ascertain
whether she was going to be terminated because of her age. See McKennon, 115 S. CL at

883. This fact did not, however, play any role in the disposition of the case.
93. See id. at 885-86.
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being searched because of wrongdoing and being fired because of misconduct or incompetence.
The intuition that motive transforms conduct and cannot easily be
separated from the conduct it motivates animated another Supreme
Court decision, Wisconsin v. Mitchell.94 In that case, a defendant found
guilty of inciting a group of teenagers to commit an assault and battery
on a young boy was given an increased sentence because his crime was
found to have been motivated by racial animus toward the victim. The
defendant, respondent in the Supreme Court, challenged this sentence
enhancement under the First Amendment and claimed that he was being
penalized because of his thoughts. He argued that the difference between a hate crime and a non-hate crime is what lies in the mind of the
offender, and the contents of one's mind may not be subject to criminal
punishment. His argument failed, and the Supreme Court held that like
anti-discrimination law-which takes a category of conduct and prohibits
it if and only if it is motivated by a discriminatory animus-the Wisconsin
hate-crime sentence-enhancement provision was legitimate because acts
that are motivated by invidious animus are different from the "same" acts
95
motivated by something else.

Unlike the Fourth Amendment, of course, anti-discrimination law
and hate-crime sentencing enhancements are designed almost entirely to
address the targeting harm, the harm of being singled out for mistreatment for an illegitimate reason. Where the Fourth Amendment limit on
searches is primarily about privacy for people who are not (to the knowledge of the authorities) concealing evidence, the anti-discrimination law
is not primarily about job retention for those who are (to the knowledge
of the employer) performing their jobs well.
What signals a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches is the absence of a specific state of mind-the intention to perform a search on the basis of known information from which
one could reasonably infer that a search would disclose evidence. What
triggers the application of anti-discrimination law, by contrast, is the presence of a specific state of mind-the intention to terminate (or otherwise
disadvantage) an employee because of her race, sex, or other protected
status. In other words, the focus of the Fourth Amendment is on the state
of mind that fulfills the legal requirements by seeking evidence of crime
based on probable cause, while the focus of anti-discrimination law is on
the state of mind that violates the law, by intending harm on the basis of a
prohibited category.
This tells us that the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches is fundamentally about limiting investigative activity to searches
that uncover crime, and it confronts targeting only within that specific
94. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
95. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes
Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 6.
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context. It similarly reveals that the anti-discrimination law is fundamentally about avoiding employment practices that single people out because
of their membership in specified groups, and it confronts employees'
merit or qualifications only within that specific context.
The fact that addressing the targeting harm is not the main purpose
of the Fourth Amendment does not mean, however, that this is not a
significant secondary purpose, just as the fact that securing job proficiency is not the main goal of the anti-discrimination law does not make
merit inconsequential to that body of law. If an employee deserves to be
fired because she has engaged in conduct for which she would have been
terminated had the employer known of the conduct, that employee does
not deserve the job, even though she deserves not to be fired because of
her age. The McKennon Court accordingly refused to hold that reinstatement would be an appropriate remedy for the petitioner, because the
wrong she suffered was not the loss of the job, which was-on the facts
conceded at summary judgment-deserved; the wrong she suffered was
the bias-motivated termination. 96 Similarly, if an individual deserves to
be searched because he has engaged in concealment for which he would
have been legally subject to a search had the police officer known of that
concealment, that individual does not deserve privacy from the search,
even though he deserves not to be searched because of an arbitrary decision to target him. It is accordingly not clear that we should "reinstate"
his privacy by overlooking any evidence found in his possession. 97 The
96. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886 (determining that award of frontpay and
reinstatement would be inappropriate).
97. To the extent that the exclusionary rule is considered part and parcel of the
Fourth Amendment, that is exactly what it does. Justice Brennan has been one of the
staunchest proponents of this view of the rule. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 930 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A proper understanding of the broad purposes
sought to be served by the Fourth Amendment demonstrates that the principles embodied
in the exclusionary rule rest upon a far firmer constitutional foundation than the shifting
sands of the Court's deterrence rationale."); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (noting that
exclusion is "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"); Kamisar,
Comparative Reprehensibility, supra note 23, at 36 n.151, 47-48. The crux of the
argument is that if officials forego searches for which they lack adequate ex ante
justification, as they are required to do under the Court's long-held understanding of the
Fourth Amendment, then some criminal activity will go undetected. That is a necessary
price to pay, however, for privacy and freedom from a totalitarian government. It follows,
the argument goes, that when police violate the Fourth Amendment and thereby acquire
evidence of crime, that evidence constitutes unjust enrichment of the government and its
use at the searchee's criminal trial is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. Foregoing its
use is accordingly a restoration of the state of affairs envisioned by the Fourth Amendment
itself, independent of any deterrent or other consequences that such suppression might
incidentally have.
As opposed to those who view exclusion as a constitutional mandate, most scholars
and lay people are somewhat uncomfortable with the cover that the Fourth Amendment
gives guilty people to perpetrate their crimes. Nonetheless, they favor exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence as a means of deterring violations of the Fourth Amendment. See
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individual's privacy was appropriately invaded; it was the unreasonableness
of the search that constituted the wrongdoing and that should therefore
be rectified. It is this distinction that renders the exclusionary rule so
discomfiting and makes it appear incoherent as a "requirement" of the
Fourth Amendment: it addresses a harm that did not take place, a harm
to a deserved privacy right.
C.

Overbreadth and History Revisited

We saw earlier that the Innocence model provides a theory of the
Fourth Amendment that is similar in some ways to First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. We also reviewed the history of the Fourth Amendment and observed that the Innocence model is consistent with that history. Let us return now to overbreadth and to history in the light of the
Innocence plus Targeting model.
1.

Innocence Plus Targeting and Overbreadth. -

The analogy of First

Amendment overbreadth doctrine further illuminates the weakness of
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the harm experienced by the guilty
under the Innocence plus Targeting model-the targeting harm. Justice
White's concurring opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul argued that the
Minneapolis ordinance was unconstitutional because it reached beyond
Stewart, supra note 62, at 1381 (arguing that exclusion is a necessary means of effectively
enforcing the Fourth Amendment, even though the Constitution, as understood through
text and history, does not itself require exclusion). Those who subscribe to this approach
include members of the Supreme Court who continue to support the exclusionary rule,
albeit with limited enthusiasm. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (questioning the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 467 (1976) (refusing to extend the
exclusionary rule to habeas corpus proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (refusing to
extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings). Indeed, as Henry Monaghan
explains, by the end of its 1974 Term the Supreme Court had flatly rejected the idea of
exclusion as a personal right and had reconceptualized the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule as a judicially created deterrent vehicle. See Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv.L. Rev. 1,
3-5 (1975).
To those who wish to retain the exclusionary rule in its current form, the opposition
of some crime-control proponents to privacy rights for the guilty often appears
unprincipled. The proponents, in other words, seem simultaneously to support the idea of
Fourth Amendment privacy (which benefits both guilty and innocent) and to balk at the
inevitable consequences of such privacy: occasional criminal cover. See Silas Wasserstrom
& WilliamJ. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule On The Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 87-88 n.21 (1984) (referencing various studies which assess the cost
of exclusion as extremely low-one percent or less-when measured by indices such as the
percentage of arrests that are rejected for prosecution because of illegally seized evidence,
the percentage of suppression motions that are granted, and the percentage of cases
declined by prosecutors primarily because of illegal searches); compare Harry M. Caldwell
& Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun's Call to
Examine the Rule in Light of ChangingJudicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside
the Courtroom, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 45, 50-52 (1994) (explaining that although few
prosecutions are lost because of exclusion and few suppression motions are granted, the
exclusionary rule breeds public hostility toward the criminal justice system).
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the unprotected conduct of R.A.V. to the protected conduct of others.98
On this argument, R.A.V., the unprotected cross-burner, was permitted to
assert the defense of overbreadth in order to allow him to act as a surrogate for the protected speakers who are likely to be chilled by the ordinance but who will not complain. Recall the analogy to A (the effective
deodorizer), who is given the suppression vehicle so that he has the incentive to make unreasonable searches costly for the police and thereby
protect the deserving innocent who are unlikely to litigate their claims.
In the light of the Innocence plus Targeting model, we reexamine
the analogy between R.A.V. and A to determine whether A might be entitled to assert an individual claim rather than simply acting as a surrogate
for the deserving innocent. The Innocence model would deny any personal claim and treat the availability of the suppression motion as exclusively an instrumental means of providing a deterrent against future government misconduct. The Innocence plus Targeting model, however,
recognizes that A has suffered a harm to his own individual interests. A
different conception of the overbreadth doctrine provides a useful
analogy.
We need not view LA.V. as merely a surrogate for people chilled by
the challenged statute from exercising protected speech. R.A.V. himself
has suffered the harm of being judged by an invalid law. Though R.A.V.
could be legitimately prosecuted under a law that prohibits vandalism,
intimidation, or even prejudice-motivated vandalism and intimidation, 9 9
he cannot be legitimately prosecuted for expressing a disapproved
message, and this is precisely what the St. Paul ordinance criminalized.10 0
98. See 505 U.S. 377, 397 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
99. The R.A.V Court described the situation as follows:
What we have here, it must be emphasized, is not a prohibition of fighting words
that are directed at certain persons or groups (which would be facially valid if it
met the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause); but rather, a prohibition
of fighting words that contain (as the Minnesota Supreme Court repeatedly
emphasized) messages of "bias-motivated" hatred and in particular, as applied to
this case, messages "based on virulent notions of racial supremacy."
Id. at 392 (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508, 511 (Minn. 1991))
(second emphasis added).

100. On this view, the vociferous disagreement between the majority and the
concurrence masks deep methodological kinship. Both opinions would allow the
regulation of cross-burning, but neither would allow R.A.V. to be prosecuted for his crossburning under a statute that fails to distinguish between what R.A.V. did and the
constitutionally protected expression of one's viewpoint.

The majority attacks the

underinclusiveness of the ordinance (its limitation of prosecution to those fighting words
expressing a particular message), see id. at 392, while the concurrence attacks its
overinclusiveness (its extension to people who wish to express R.A.V.'s message through
constitutionally protected avenues), see id. at 397 (White, J., concurring); cf. Akhil R.
Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments: RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 124 (1992) (noting various common assumptions in the respective
approaches of the majority and the concurrence in R.A.V. and exploring potential
alternatives to these approaches that would have been available if the Justices had
considered the Thirteenth Amendment as part of their analysis).
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Under the theory that there is a right to be judged by a valid law,' 0 ' punishing RA.V. under the ordinance would be like punishing him for his
race or because he is a communist. The invalid law punishes R.A.V. for
the wrong reason. The fact that he independently happens to deserve to
be punished does not redeem the source or reason for his punishment in
the particular case.
There is a Fourth Amendment parallel to this overbreadth harm of
being judged by an invalid law. A (the effective deodorizer) had a right
not to be targeted or singled out for an illegitimate reason, the police
officer's dislike of his personal style. A retained this right in spite of the
fact that he actually deserved the outcome of the targeting in this particular case: having the hiding place of the dead body searched and the evidence discovered. As with R.A.V., the harm is not in the substantive result (prosecution of R.A.V. and revelation of A's hiding place) but in the
process that motivated that result. In other words, R.A.V. has not suffered a speech harm, 10 2 and A has not suffered a privacy harm.
The parallel, however, between overbreadth and exclusion for purposes of the targeting harm ends there. The overbreadth remedy is far
better suited to curing the actual harm experienced by R.A.V. than is the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for redressing A's injury. Even
when the overbreadth doctrine has been applied, it is still permissible for
the government to prosecute cross-burners like R.A.V. for the right reason, under a different (valid) law. The dismissal of the invalid prosecution remedies the government's use of an invalid law, while the wrongdoer is still punished for his misdeed.
Under the exclusionary rule, by contrast, it is generally not possible
to conduct a search for the "right reason" once a finding is made that the
original search was unreasonable. The information on which a second
search would be based will almost certainly be derived from (and therefore tainted by) the initial illegal decision to search.' 03 When an officer
searches A without probable cause, it is likely to be the case that no officer
has probable cause to search A at that time. Therefore, an attempt to
restore the status quo prior to the Fourth Amendment violation will likely
101. See Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3; see also Dorf,

supra note 6, at 242-51 (justifying Monaghan's conclusion that there is a general right to

be prosecuted under a valid law).
102. This is the view of the concurrence in R.A.V., which conceptualized the case as
one of overbreadth. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397 (White, J., concurring). By contrast, the
majority viewed R.AV.as a victim of content and viewpoint discrimination, on the theory
that he was being punished because of the views expressed by his conduct. See id. at
393-94; see also Dorf, supra note 6, at 257-61 (discussing implications of majority
response to concurrence).
103. Note, of course, that if it can be proven that the fruit of the illegal search would
inevitably have been discovered legitimately, even if the illegal search had not taken place,
then the evidence will be admitted. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). This
will usually be difficult to prove, however, and the possibility of proving inevitable discovery
also serves to undermine any deterrent effect that exclusion might otherwise have had.
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include restoring some aspect of the privacy of the criminal by prohibiting the admission of the found evidence. This restoration of privacy is
problematic, because the criminal had no right to retain his privacy.
Moreover, there is no way to undo the targeting harm, since it has
already been completed with the performance of the search. Under the
Innocence plus Targeting model, then, the exclusionary rule is flawed as
a remedy for the person searched, both because it returns to him a benefit
that he did not deserve to have and because it fails to rectify the loss that
he did not deserve to suffer.
This is not to say, however, that exclusion is inconsistent with the
Innocence plus Targeting model. As a deterrent, exclusion has the same
costs and benefits under the Innocence plus Targeting model as it does
under the Innocence model.' 0 4 Under both these models, however, the
exclusionary rule is not dictated by the Fourth Amendment rights of defendants who are unreasonably searched. If it is adopted, it is purely as a
means of eliminating a police incentive for performing unreasonable
searches. 10 5 The Innocence plus Targeting model-like the Innocence
model-is therefore agnostic as to whether there ought to be a Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. The resolution of this doubt, however,
would turn primarily on empirical rather than theoretical questions.
2. Innocence Plus Targeting and History. - As we saw earlier, the
Innocence model is consistent with the historical purposes of the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches. 10 6 The Innocence plus Targeting model, however, provides a more complete account
of the evils that inspired the framing of the Fourth Amendment. 0 7 The
104. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (discussing innocence and
overbreadth).
105. Henry Monaghan has criticized the Supreme Court's assumed authority to

fashion its own common law remedies for Fourth Amendment violations by state officials.
See Monaghan, supra note 97 at 3-5; see also Akhil R. Amar, The Future of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. (forthcoming November 1996) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Amar explains his view by using the metaphor of the
"Leavenworth Lottery":
Judicial remedies must fit the scope of the right. For example, a court is not free,
as a matter of constitutional law, to play the "Leavenworth lottery": Because the
government violated the constitutional rights of A, judges spin the wheel and
spring some lucky (but unrelated) convict B from Leavenworth. This scheme
might indeed deter-and a legislature'might have the power to enact this into
law-but courts have no such power as a matter of traditional remedial theory.
And without [the argument that the Constitution compels exclusion, which the
Supreme Court has rejected repeatedly], exclusion is analytically
indistinguishable from the "Leavenworth lottery."
Id. at 8.
106. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
107. Jed Rubenfeld explains that history illuminates the purposes behind a
constitutional provision by providing "the paradigm cases of a right's applicability." Jed
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 Yale LJ. 1119, 1170 (1995). Such
cases are the "particular evils or abuses felt to be intolerable at the time of enactment" of a
constitutional guarantee. Id. at 1169. These abuses, in turn, do more than dictate the
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general warrants and writs of assistance, two vehicles used by agents of the
British Crown to invade the colonists' privacy, were offensive to early
Americans because the warrants permitted groundless and arbitrary
searches. Searches that are unlikely to yield evidence are unjustified
largely because of the virtual certainty of invading innocent people's privacy. This aspect of the problem is captured well by the Innocence
model.
However, the Innocence model leaves unexplained the problem of
why the particular individuals subjected to searches were chosen to undergo this indignity. The American colonists considered the general warrants and writs of assistance both substantively and procedurally illegitimate. Substantively, the warrants were used to single out and censor the
views of those who dared to criticize the government. Opposition to this
objective is reflected in the First Amendment freedoms of speech and the
press.' 08 In the case of the writs of assistance, the singling out of individuals in an effort to enforce excessive trade restrictions and taxes imposed
by the British Crown was also seen as improper.10 9
Along these lines, even those people who were "guilty" because they
were in possession of the evidence sought should not have been subjected
to unreasonable searches. The value placed on avoiding mistreatment of
even the "right" people for the "wrong" reasons is reflected in what this
Article has called the targeting harm. We have seen, of course, that the
presence of the targeting harm is not contingent upon the nature of the
"guilty" person's conduct. Whether a person is engaged in criticizing the
government or in growing marijuana, he has a right not to be singled out
without a legitimate basis. 1 10
The Innocence plus Targeting model therefore captures the multiplicity of harms manifest in the British practices that helped inspire the
framing of the Fourth Amendment. The model describes a privacy harm
that results from the official authority to search anyone at any time for
any reason: no one-however law-abiding and innocent-can feel secure from government intrusion. Furthermore, the model describes a
targeting harm that occurs when officials base their decisions to search
upon illegitimate considerations: distrust of anyone who appears critical
of the government, for example. One could indeed characterize the act
of governmental targeting as essentially a decision to single out nonconformists for investigation. In this sense, the spirit of the First Amendment
continued commitment of the Constitution to their abolition; they also provide a valuable

starting point in assessing the constitutional meaning of a modem governmental action.
See id. at 1170.
108. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... ").
109. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
110. Cf. Colb, supra note 39, at 790-94 (arguing that the violation vel non of a
person's fundamental right to be free from physical confinement should not turn on

whether the conduct for which the person has been incarcerated is or is not
constitutionally protected).
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right to dissent is more than simply a right not to be punished or sued for
that dissent; is a right, as well, not to be subjected to the indignity of
governmental intrusions motivated by a disrespect for difference. This
spirit suffuses the Fourth Amendment as well.
D. Experiencing the Targeting Harm
Upon learning about the targeting harm allegedly experienced by
the guilty, a proponent of the Innocence model might respond with the
following argument: a person who is subjected to a search and who is
concealing evidence of crime should assume that the reason she has been
searched is that she is, in fact, concealing such evidence. The targeting
harm is experienced only when the person targeted knows that she has
been singled out for reasons stemming from something other than the
evidence sought. Since there is no way for the person who is searched to
know what is in the minds of the police officers, as long as she is guilty,
she should attribute the search to that guilt and not to an illegitimate
motive. Therefore, no remedy at all is necessary for the targeted guilty,
since no Fourth Amendment harm is actually experienced.
One flaw in this argument is that although there is no direct way for
a victim to know the contents of a perpetrator's mind, there are indirect
ways to determine why a particular act was committed. This inquiry is
ubiquitous in the criminal law. For example, an actor's mental state can
be the difference between conviction and acquittal, even when the physical acts are undisputed. The person who is searched might judge the
motive of the police officer conducting the search by listening to what the
officer says in the course of the search (Is murder mentioned? Does the
officer seem to fear for her safety? Does the officer have a warrant?) or by
inquiring afterward what led the officer to the particular suspect. Such
information is often revealed, for example, during testimony at trial.
Furthermore, people who are targeted because something about
them is unappealing to the police are likely to have the experience happen more than once."1 ' This pattern of targeting may also enlighten the
suspect about the motives behind her selection.
Finally, the potential ignorance of the victim in a given case does not
distinguish the Fourth Amendment from anti-discrimination law, which
111. It is common knowledge, for example, that minorities and the poor are
disproportionately singled out for invasions of their privacy. This disparity is most
prevalent in informal (and largely unmonitored) "on the street" interactions with the

police. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. LJ. 659, 679-81 (1994) (discussing how judicial
construction of "reasonableness" necessarily produces a disproportionate impact on
minority communities and on the poor); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters,"
Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter? 26
Val. U. L Rev. 243, 250-62 (1991); Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken
Promises: The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. LJ. 567, 583-86
(1991).
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compensates people who have been singled out for mistreatment because
of a specified motive. Some members of an oppressed group might imagine that all slights are motivated by prejudice even though some, in fact,
are not. Conversely, some individuals might not be aware that they are
being treated in a certain way because of group membership even when
they are being singled out.
The legal recognition of a kind of harm does not ordinarily turn on
whether the harm was perceived by the victim at the time. The law sensibly concludes that where there is an accusation of illicit targeting (which
takes place whenever there is a suppression motion or an anti-discrimination suit) and that accusation turns out to be accurate, the victim of the
targeting correctly perceived what happened to her and accordingly experienced its attendant indignity.
How then do we understand the beneficial outcome in the violation
of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches? The privacy
right, as distinct from the right against targeting, turns on the conduct of
the private individual rather than that of the government. In utilizing
one's private space in a legally permissible manner, one retains a Fourth
Amendment privacy interest. By abusing that private space through illegal activity and concealment of evidence, by contrast, one forfeits one's
Fourth Amendment privacy interest. Though the government may not
act on that forfeiture until it has some level of knowledge about it, perhaps probable cause, the forfeiture is no less real from the perspective of
1 12
the individual.
By claiming that the guilty concealer of criminal evidence forfeits a
right of privacy in being free from a search of the place of concealment, I
am not suggesting that criminals deserve no privacy as a general matter.
Indeed, the Fourth Amendment does not permit blanket searches of people even when the police know they are guilty. The searches must be
tailored to the areas of concealment. The forfeiture of one's privacy entitlement, in other words, extends only so far as the abuse of the privacy
right. If the criminal is hiding nothing, he forfeits no privacy.
Suppose, then, that B has three houses and that a police officer
knows that B is concealing a dead body in house #1 and that there is no
evidence in houses #2 and #3. The officer may not search houses #2 and
#3. In pragmatic terms, it is not necessary or useful to search those
houses, since there is no evidence there. In moral terms, the criminal has
forfeited his privacy only in the place where he abused it, house #1.
Inevitably, a line must be drawn between the area of the proper
search and the area where searching is impermissible. In the real world,
where police have limited information, such a line is drawn in terms of
112. Cf. supra text accompanying note 12 (discussing how speech, incitement, and
the government's lack of knowledge of an incident of incitement affects the propriety of its
intervention from the perspective of government responsibility but not the individual's
entitlement to incite freely).
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likely places of concealment for the particular evidence sought. Often,
an entire house will be searched if there is probable cause to believe that
the house contains evidence of murder. In issuing a warrant, a magistrate
must decide how far the probable cause extends and articulate specifically the "place[s] to be searched." 1 3
The inquiry in the "ideal" Fourth Amendment world-where we
know in advance what we will find and we focus on how much privacy the
person searched deserves-will be quite similar to the real-world magistrate's inquiry. The line must now be drawn between the space in which
the evidence is concealed, however one wishes to define that space, and
all other spaces.
One could describe A (deodorizing murderer) as having forfeited
his privacy right to his closet or as having forfeited his privacy right to the
portion of his closet where the body is hidden but not of some other
severable portion. One might even choose to describe the body as hidden in A's house, with A having forfeited the privacy in his entire house
by hiding a murder victim there.
The most appealing formulation, it seems to me, mirrors the pragmatic one: A forfeits the portion of his private space that, if kept private,
would preclude uncovering the body. This forfeiture would include the
entry path in the hallway and the portion of the closet in which the body
is hidden. Just as in the probable cause inquiry, where one must define at
some level of generality the location where one is likely to find evidence,
the privacy entitlement inquiry requires specific definition of the location
where the evidence is hidden. The criminal is therefore not simply "bad"
and consequently deserving of no privacy at all. He has been "bad" in a
particular way: he has used his privacy to obstruct justice. Similarly, if
freedom
and when the criminal goes to prison, he will lose that level of
14
inconsistent with the need for his secure institutionalization."
III.

A

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF EXISTING DOCrRINE

In considering various models of the Fourth Amendment, we saw
that the Formalist model most faithfully tracks the doctrinal requirements of the Fourth Amendment. This correspondence is no coincidence. The essence of Formalism is that when the law prohibits specific
state action, there is a harm only when that state action occurs. What the
model lacks, however, is an overarching theory of the Fourth Amendment to ensure the continuing vitality of the doctrine as it confronts new
and challenging fact patterns. Such a theory could explain our reactions
to cases in which the rule and the apparent policies behind the rule are
in tension. Specifically, it might help us to understand our reservations
about applying the Fourth Amendment to the guilty.
113. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
114. See Colb, supra note 39, at 822.
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The Innocence model furnishes us with an overarching theory and
still manages to cohere with most existing doctrine, including the exclusionary rule. The Innocence model, however, is incomplete. It fails to
account for the effect of police officers' intentions on the people who are
subjected to searches. It leaves out the harm of being targeted illegitimately and it thereby treats the "reasonableness" rule of the Fourth
Amendment as irrelevant to its underlying purposes. The targeting harm
provides the missing element and, together with the important insights of
the Innocence model, helps to form a more comprehensive picture of
the Fourth Amendment.
Having considered the targeting harm and its importance to the
Fourth Amendment,1 5 it may be tempting to merge targeting and privacy harms and reject the notion that some searches result in only one
but not the other kind of harm. In other words, we might choose to
reject the complex relationship between innocence and the privacy harm
and instead take the simpler view that the Fourth Amendment is about
targeting people for privacy invasions without proper justification.
Accordingly, in the absence of targeting (singling out the persons
searched without proper justification), there would be no privacy harm,
regardless of innocence, and in the presence of targeting, there would be
a privacy harm, regardless of guilt. Under this scheme, motivational
harm and privacy harm would be inseparable. This approach would lead
us back to the simplicity of Formalism, which we now understand to be
concerned exclusively with the motivational harm that I have identified as
targeting.
The analytic struggle between the simplicity of Formalism and the
normative intuition that innocence has a significant role to play in the
drama of the Fourth Amendment has made its way into Supreme Court
precedent. It is worth examining this struggle, because the ensuing confusion provides support for the argument that the Innocence plus
Targeting model is necessary and, despite its complexity, improves upon
both alternatives.
A. Zurcher: A Case Study in the Formalist and Innocence Models
An important case demonstrating the Supreme Court's efforts to determine its own theory of the Fourth Amendment is Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily." 6 In Zurcher, a group of student reporters was present at a
Stanford University hospital when a riot broke out, during which several
police officers were assaulted and seriously injured. The police were unable to ascertain the identities of the assailants but were hopeful for a
115. See supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text.
116. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). For a valuable critique of the Court's treatment of the facts
presented in Zurcher and its failure to consider the dangers of importing the probable
cause and warrant requirements into the area of searches for mere evidence, see Amar,

supra note 13, at 765-66, 779-80 & n.87.
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lead when the paper ran a special issue about the protest, which included
117
a photograph.
The police obtained a warrant that authorized a search of the newspaper office for evidence associated with the hospital attack. The warrant
affidavit contained no allegation of involvement by the newspaper in any
criminal activity.
The search was extensive. Photographic laboratories, filing cabinets,
desks, and wastepaper baskets were examined. Police officers also read
notes and correspondence in the course of their search. The inspection
ultimately turned up nothing.
A month after the search, the Stanford Daily brought an action
against all those involved in the search, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The newspaper prevailed in the district court on two separate theories, only one of which is pertinent to our
discussion. 11 8 The district court held that a search of someone not suspected of crime may only be authorized where there is probable cause to
believe that a subpoena duces tecum"19 would be impracticable and when
it also appears that the possessor of the objects sought would disobey a
court order forbidding their removal or destruction.' 2 0 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court
decision and adopted its reasoning,' 2 ' but the Supreme Court reversed,
117. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 551.
118. The first theory contended that because the newspaper was engaged in First
Amendment activity, the standard for "reasonableness" should have been heightened
relative to the usual probable cause inquiry. The district court held that
[b]ecause a search presents an overwhelming threat to the press's ability to
gather and disseminate the news, and because 'less drastic means' exist to obtain
the same information, third-party searches of a newspaper office are
impermissible in all but a very few situations. A search warrant should be

permitted only in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that 1)
important materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and 2) a
restraining order would be futile. To stop short of this standard would be to

sneer at all the First Amendment has come to represent in our society.
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (footnotes and emphasis
omitted), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).

Constitutional law scholars have treated Zurcher as essentially a case about the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 74, § 12-22, at 974. However, as this Article
suggests, Zurcher is an extremely significant Fourth Amendment case as well. Indeed,
although there are free speech and free press rights that are incidentally affected by this
decision, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the characterization of the case as a First
Amendment case and emphasized that only Fourth Amendment considerations drove the
decision. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565.
119. A subpoena duces tecum is a "court process, initiated by party in litigation,
compelling production of certain specific documents and other items, material and
relevant to facts in issue in a pendingjudicial proceeding, which documents and items are
in custody and control of person or body served with process." Black's Law Dictionary
1426 (6th ed. 1990).
120. See Zurcher,353 F. Supp. at 124.
121. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464, 465 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S.
547 (1978).
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holding that if there is a warrant and probable cause, then a search is
reasonable. The Court explained that "whether the third-party occupant
the criminal law and
is suspect or not, the State's interest in enforcing
122
same."
the
remains
evidence
the
recovering
In other words, because the purpose of an authorized Fourth
Amendment search is to locate evidence of crime, the limitations that the
Fourth Amendment places upon searches rest exclusively upon the likelihood of finding such evidence.' 23 It follows that if the likelihood is great
(or reasonable) that evidence will be found, the identity of the person
searched ought to be immaterial.
By invoking the recovery of evidence as the overriding interest defining Fourth Amendment reasonableness, the Court adopts a pragmatic alternative to the Innocence model, where innocence is replaced by the
absence of any evidence on one's person or property. Under this approach, innocence itself is not an important fact in the Court's Fourth
Amendment scheme.
Reexamination of the hypothetical cases of A, B, and C discussed
above clarifies the Court's position and the relationship of that position
to the Innocence model. 124 In developing the Innocence model, we regarded A (deodorizing murderer) and C (smelly innocent) as an unintended beneficiary and an unintended casualty, respectively, of the balance struck by the Fourth Amendment. This balance-the standard of
probable cause-is an effort to predict with incomplete information
whether a search will uncover evidence, as in the case of A, or whether it
will simply invade privacy without uncovering any evidence, as in the case
of C. In the world of perfect information, people in A's position would
always be searched and people like C never would be. Is it the guilt of A
and the innocence of C, though, that are determinative? Judge now the
case of D.
D is an innocent person. In D's closet, D's landlord Z has hidden a
corpse. D does not suspect anything, because he does not realize that Z
secretly made a copy of D's house key before turning over the house for
rental. Z was able to go into D's home to hide the corpse in a garbage
bag in the closet while D was away at work. D does not learn of the presence of the corpse because he has a chronic allergic condition that blocks
his sense of smell. A police officer passing D's home, however, smells the
decaying body and obtains a warrant leading to a search and the consequent revelation of the corpse in D's closet.
D, like C, is an innocent person who "deserves" privacy in the sense
that he has done nothing culpable to forfeit his privacy. Just as there
seemed to be no moral distinction between A (deodorizing murderer)
122. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 560.

123. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43 (discussing negligence analogy to the
Fourth Amendment).
124. See supra Part I.B (defining and discussing Innocence model).
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and B (nondeodorizing murderer), there. seems to be no moral distinction to be drawn between C and D. Yet the outcome of the search of D
seems to conform to the goals of the Fourth Amendment better than the
outcome of the search of C.
The relevant distinctions, however, now appear to be more about
utility than about an individual's culpability. If the difference between
the person who "deserves" to be searched and the person who does not is
simply the presence or absence of evidence-divorced from the culpability of the searchee-then perhaps it is not pertinent to speak of desert at
all in the context of the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps the only question
of harm to the person searched should be that of targeting, since the only
actor whose good or bad behavior counts is that of the officer conducting
the search (or that of the chief of police or magistrate authorizing that
search).
This resolution is attractive, because it returns us to the simplicity of
the Formalist model via a different route. Though the value of the search
may turn on the ex post question of whether it uncovers evidence of
crime, the harm experienced by the individual-the sense in which a
search violates her individual constitutional interest-turns exclusively
on ex ante reasonableness. As we will see, however, and as the Court in
Zurcher implicitly concedes, this variant on the Formalist model is inadequate as an explanatory tool. Consider D's situation again.
The search of D (innocent with evidence) does appear to be significantly different from the search of B (guilty with evidence), if we compare them more carefully. As the Supreme Court indicates in Zurcher, the
governmental interest served by both searches is the same: finding evidence of crime. In both cases, that interest is fulfilled. The search of D,
however, seems to be an unfortunate but perhaps necessary evil.
D has not done anything to forfeit his privacy, but it may be necessary to search D in order to serve the important governmental interest in
uncovering evidence of crime. B, on the other hand, deserves to be
searched. He has abused his right to privacy by using it to conceal evidence of crime and he therefore should not rightfully retain the privacy
that he has abused in this fashion.
D (innocent third party) is like C (smelly innocent), though at a different level of generality. The Fourth Amendment permits the search of
C, because given the existence of probable cause, prohibiting that search
would have the consequence of permitting too many people like B (and
A) (the murderers) to go undetected. The search of C is itself an unfortunate by-product of allowing the kind of search that will normally expose
people like B. We value the evidence we will obtain from all the Bs more
than we value the few Cs' individual privacy, in other words, even though
C fully deserves that privacy and has done nothing to abuse it.
Similarly, we might permit the search of D because we value the evidence we will find in his closet more than we value his privacy. The utilitarian balance struck by the Fourth Amendment may implicitly place a
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higher value on obtaining evidence (when that evidence is likely to be
obtained) than on preserving the privacy of those who deserve it. This
calculus does not, however, negate the fact that D's loss of privacy remains a cost from the perspective of the Fourth Amendment, albeit one
that must be borne.
One might argue, moreover, that even within the framework of
purely utilitarian Fourth Amendment concerns, there is an important distinction between D and B. Since no one believes that D has participated
in criminal activity, it is apparent that he will likely cooperate with the
police and provide the necessary evidence without the need for a
search.' 25 Searching D is therefore arguably inappropriate, even considered ex post. Because the goal is to obtain evidence, if evidence may be
obtained without violating an individual's private space, it would appear
"unreasonable" to violate that private space. Conversely, the fact that a
guilty person would be likely to destroy rather than hand over evidence
requested by the prosecution makes his guilt an important factor in deciding the necessity of a search. The relationship between innocence and
privacy accordingly coincides with the pragmatic purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.
If we knew ahead of time that a search of a given person would be
unnecessary-either because the person searched had no evidence on
her premises or because she would have cooperated happily with the police without being subjected to a search-the search of this person, a
person like C or a person like D, would be undesirable under the apparent goals of the Fourth Amendment. Innocence, in other words, would
continue to matter.
There is one additional and obvious argument for considering the
difference between innocence and guilt a relevant facet of Fourth
Amendment law and, therefore, for rejecting the formalism of the holding in Zurcher. The Fourth Amendment permits, though with some restrictions, searches for evidence of crime.' 26 This means that a person's
privacy is protected only until there is evidence amounting to probable
cause (or some other standard of "reasonableness") to believe that a
guilty person could be apprehended through an intrusion upon that privacy, and ultimately prosecuted, convicted, and deprived of virtually all
125. D could cooperate either by removing the body bag himself or by permitting the
police to remove the evidence after D has had a chance to hide his own personal effects.
126. But see Amar, supra note 13, at 758. Amar believes that viewing the Fourth
Amendment as solely or even primarily a criminal provision of the Constitution is a
mistake. He explains that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment applies equally to civil and criminal law enforcement.
Its text speaks to all government searches and seizures, for whatever reason. Its
history is not uniquely bound up with criminal law... And the Amendment
presupposes a civil damage remedy, not exclusion of evidence in criminal trials;
its global command that all government searches and seizures be reasonable
sounds not in criminal law but in constitutional tort law.
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privacy' 27 (and even liberty)' 28 upon conviction. Innocence (or apparent innocence) is where privacy begins, and guilt (or apparent guilt) is
where (to a great extent) it ends. It seems to follow from this that the
search of an innocent person is a harm not only because it is unnecessary,
but also because the innocent person deserves better.
Similarly, the search of the guilty person is acceptable-putting aside
the targeting harm-not only because it uncovers evidence of crime but
because the abuse of his privacy through concealment of evidence of
crime constituted a forfeiture of that privacy. The interest in finding "evidence" cannot be conceptually dissociated from the ultimate reason one
cares about finding evidence of wrongdoing: the consequent ability to
129
punish the wrongdoer.
AsJustice Stevens explains in his dissent in Zurcher, when the person
whose home contains evidence is likely to be a criminal,13 0 "[tihe
1
probability of criminal culpability justifies the invasion of his privacy."''
Justice Stevens's statement invokes the moral dimension of the Fourth
Amendment, that dimension concerned with innocence.
Justice Stevens separately articulates the pragmatic aspect of the
Fourth Amendment: "[T]he need to accomplish the law enforcement
purpose of the search [when the person is guilty] justifies acting without
advance notice and by force, if necessary."' 3 2 Compared with searching
the guilty, then, searching the innocent serves neither the moral nor the
pragmatic dimensions of the Fourth Amendment.
Though the Zurcherholding appears unresponsive to the contention
that privacy rights are linked to innocence of crime, the discussion in the
127. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (determining that "society
is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a
[convicted] prisoner might have in his prison cell"); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
557 (1979) (finding that prisonersjailed and awaiting trial in federal detention facility lack
a legitimate expectation of privacy sufficient to render unscheduled inspections of their
cells "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
128. See Colb, supra note 39, at 824 (arguing that so long as incarceration serves a
compelling state interest, such as protecting the safety of citizens from harm, an offender
may, through imprisonment, be constitutionally deprived of his fundamental right to
liberty).
129. Cf. id. at 794-95 (arguing that it is constitutionally improper to dissociate act of
incarceration from reasons for incarceration).
130. Because, for example, he possesses "contraband or the proceeds or tools of
crime." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 581 (1978) (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
131. Id. It is Justice Stevens's position that the rule prior to Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) was the "correct" reading of the Fourth Amendment: warrants could be
used only to search for contraband, weapons, and plunder, not for "mere evidence."
Hayden, 387 U.S. at 301. This rule, Justice Stevens explained, guaranteed that only when it
seemed likely that the object of the search would be uncooperative-because he had
apparently participated in the relevant crime-could a search take place. If the person in
whose possession the evidence was located was an innocent third party, however, efforts
would be made to avoid a search through the cooperation of the individual. See Zurcher,
436 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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majority opinion betrays a sympathy for that position and accordingly for
the Innocence model of the Fourth Amendment. After indicating that
the state's interest in searching for evidence is the same regardless of the
searchee's guilt or innocence, the majority makes a series of additional
arguments to justify its holding.
First, it explains that if the allegedly innocent third party knows that
there are illegal materials on her property, then she is "sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance of a search warrant." 1as Furthermore, if the
third party is ignorant of the presence of evidence on her property, she
will be "so informed when the search warrant is served, and it is doubtful
that [s]he should then be permitted to object to the search."'m In other
words, the third party either is guilty for knowingly concealing evidence
of crime or else becomes guilty-and consequently undeserving of privacy-by refusing to cooperate with police upon being informed of her
previously unknowing concealment.
The Court next argues that police may not know whether a third
party is innocent or guilty at the time of the search.' 3 5 Apparently, as a
result, the possessor of evidence of crime must be presumed guilty for
purposes of the search, in order to avoid loss or destruction of evidence
in the event that such a presumption proves to be accurate. Finally, the
majority explains that "in the real world," on those occasions when a subpoena duces tecum would do the job, police will use it rather than go to
the trouble of obtaining a search warrant.' 3 6
Most of the Court's reasoning, then, is predicated on the view that an
innocent person should not be searched if such a search is avoidable.
Notice the construction of the arguments: first, the person is not really
innocent; second, the person appears to the police not really to be innocent; third, the police will protect the innocent without our commanding
them to do so. Innocence is therefore connected with one's entitlement
37
to privacy, even according to the majority in Zurcher.'
B.

United States v. White: The Need to Make Innocence Count

The Court's belief in the relevance of innocence to Fourth Amendment entitlements, evidenced in Zurcher despite the Court's formal announcement to the contrary, is even more apparent in cases in which
guilty rather than innocent parties claim a Fourth Amendment right. In
153. Id. at 560 (Opinion of the Court).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 561. This argument seems particularly unconvincing as applied to the

case of the Stanford Daily newspaper.
136. Id. at 563.

137. One could assert that the discussion of innocence by the Zurcher majority is
beside the point. However, it does seem telling that after indicating that innocence is not
material to the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment, the Court proceeds
to expend as much effort as it does dispelling the idea that it is condoning the
government's authority to search innocent third parties.
HeinOnline -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1509 1996

1510

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1456

United States v. White, a case decided seven years prior to Zurcher, the
Supreme Court considered the question "whether the Fourth Amendment bars from evidence the testimony of governmental agents who related certain conversations which had occurred between defendant White
and a government informant... and which the agents overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter carried by [the informant]
and concealed on his person." 138 Because the government officials involved in this surveillance did not have a warrantjustifying a "search," the
question in.this case was whether the surveillance activity amounted to a
"search" at all, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Since Katz v. United States,13 9 the question of defining a search has
been resolved by determining whether the party subjected to the surveillance had a reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated or intruded upon by the particular kind of surveillance involved.' 40 The
Court in White was operating against a background of cases holding that a
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the friends in
4
whom she confides secrets.' '
Normally, the expectation of privacy of a criminal defendant bringing a suppression motion or an appeal of a conviction must be described
without reference to the criminal activity that happened to be disclosed
by the surveillance activity. In other words, even though the petitioner in
Katz was using a public telephone to place interstate bets, the question
whether his expectation of privacy in using the telephone was "reasonable" had to be answered without regard to the content of the telephone
conversation.1 4 2 This is because police can learn of the content of the
conversation only after breaching the suspect's privacy.
138. 401 U.S. 745, 746-47 (1971).
139. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
140. In Katz, this meant that a warrant would have to be obtained to record the
telephone conversation of someone using a public telephone, because such a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation. See id. at 352.
141. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in defendant's voluntary conversations with accomplice who turned
out to be government informer); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (finding
no reasonable expectation of privacy in defendant's voluntary conversations with
undercover agent when government undercover agent, having been invited in for the
purpose of conducting a felonious transaction, made drug buy in defendant's home); On
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (finding no Fourth Amendment search or
seizure when government informant wore a radio transmitter that allowed federal agents
to eavesdrop on conversations regarding drug buy that defendant willingly entered into
with informant).
142. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Hardwick involved a criminal prosecution of a man for engaging in consensual sexual
relations with another man. Hardwick was wrongly prosecuted, injustice Blackmun's view,
because his privacy rights had been violated:
This case is no more about a "fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, than Stanley v. Georgia was about a
fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about a
fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this
HeinOnline -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1510 1996

19961

INNOCENCE, PRIVACY AND TARGETING

1511

Justice White, writing for a plurality in White, deviates from the usual
rule requiring that the Court ignore the criminal activity discovered by
the surveillance in framing the expectation of privacy, the reasonableness
of which must be assessed. First, Justice White characterizes Hoffa v.
United States' 43 and Lewis v. United States' 44 as holding that "the law gives
no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes
a police agent."1 45 Notice that the reasonableness of one's expectation of
privacy is now described as turning in part on one's status as a "wrongdoer." It follows from these cases, explains Justice White, that "neither
should [the Fourth Amendment] protect [the wrongdoer] when that
which
same [police] agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations
14 6
are later offered in evidence to prove the State's case."
Again, the searchee's' status as a wrongdoer who is later prosecuted
for crime is no longer separated from the process of defining the normative reasonableness of the searchee's subjective expectation of privacy.
"Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk
that his companions may be reporting to the police.... But if he has no
doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his."' 47
Justice Harlan wrote one of the several dissenting opinions published in White. He criticized the plurality for conceiving of the question
presented in such narrow terms, as a question about whether guilty people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in conducting their wrongful
activities. Justice Harlan explained that
[I] t is too easy to forget-and hence, too often forgotten-that
the issue here is whether to interpose a search warrant procedure between law enforcement agencies engaging in electronic
eavesdropping and the public generally. By casting its "risk analysis" solely in terms of the expectations and risks that "wrongdoers" or "one contemplating illegal activities" ought to bear, the
148
plurality opinion, I think, misses the mark entirely. On Lee
does not simply mandate that criminals must daily run the risk
of unknown eavesdroppers prying into their private affairs; it
subjects each and every law-abiding member of society to that
risk. 149
case is about "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men," namely, "the right to be let alone."
Id. (citations omitted).

143. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
144. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
145. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952).
149. White, 401 U.S. at 789 (Harlan, J., dissenting). James Boyd White offers one way
to reconcileJustice Harlan's concerns with protecting the relationships of innocent people
andJustice White's perception that guilty people confide their criminal plans at their own
risk. See James B. White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A
Study of Robinson and Mattock, 1974 Sup. C. Rev. 165, 230-31. He demonstrates that such
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Justice Harlan emphasized the importance of defining Fourth
Amendment expectations of privacy, even when they arise in criminal
cases, in a way that will protect the interests of the law-abiding members
of society, because the consequences of decisions like White will be visited
upon the innocent as well as the guilty.
Scholars have often argued that the reason the Supreme Court sometimes makes the doctrinal mistake of taking a defendant's guilt into account in determining whether there has been a search is that the exclusionary rule distorts the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by making
the viability of a criminal conviction turn on a narrow interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment right, an interpretation which will then apply to
guilty and innocent alike. 150 Such scholars contend that even when the
Court is not as explicit about what it is doing as Justice White is in White,
the Court cannot help but distort the law in an effort to avoid the injustice of reversing the conviction of a person who is clearly guilty of a seria reconciliation is possible if we permit only those deceptions in which the deceiving state
actor pretends to be a criminal. "To permit such deceptions will, after all, expose to police
spying only those people who express to strangers a willingness to engage in criminal
activity. The ordinary citizen can be secure, so far as the law can make him secure, from
such intrusions." Id. at 230. Amar notes his own affinity for this kind of analysis when he
distinguishes, through a rhetorical question, between types of deception: "Is winning a
suspected hit man's confidence by posing as a mobster different from winning entrance
into someone's home or car by posing as a stranded motorist?" Amar, supra note 18, at
804 & n.167 (citing White, supra).
Edmund Kitch characterizes Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Lewis v. United
States, 885 U.S. 206, 212 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring) as reflecting similar values:
[S]omeone willing to sell marijuana to any caller cannot reasonably rely on the
privacy of his communications with the strangers who call. Although the
undercover agent's surveillance was a search, it did not intrude on privacy. In the
same way, in the Lopez [v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)] situation, a citizen
who approaches a federal agent with a bribe offer cannot reasonably rely on the
privacy of his offer.
Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States- The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 133, 145. William Stuntz draws a corresponding distinction between use of
undercover agents in ways that "jeopardize only criminal privacy," such as what occurred in
White and Lopez, and the use of deceptive techniques that "are not so discriminating."
Stuntz, supra note 24, at 791-93. An example of the latter might consist of FBI agents
infiltrating an organization of recovering alcoholics to listen to members' disclosures and
perhaps learn of criminal activity in the process.
150. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 13, at 799 (arguing that "[judges do not like
excluding bloody knives, so they distort doctrine, claiming that the Fourth Amendment
was not really violated"); Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to
Criminal Procedure Rules, 14 Mich.J. Int'l L. 171, 174 (1993) (discussingjudicial "hedging
and fudging"). Although the broad rationale that drives White and its predecessors-the
idea that the target of an investigation has no Fourth Amendment right to expect that his
chosen confidants will be trustworthy if the investigation ultimately produces incriminating
evidence-endangers the security of innocent and guilty alike, Amar would support the
decision in White and would find no doctrinal distortion there if it were driven by the idea
described in Stuntz, supra note 24, at 791-92, that undercover agents posing as criminals
do not endanger the relational privacy of law-abiding citizens. Telephone Conversation
with Akhil P, Amar, Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School (Feb. 9, 1996).
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ous crime. But are these scholars correct that the Supreme Court generally, andJustice White in particular, err when taking guilt into account in
answering the question, "Did the defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy?"
In assessing whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court focuses on one or both of two alternative formulations of
the word "reasonable." One is an empirical formulation: an expectation
of privacy is reasonable, on this approach, if it is realistic to expect privacy
under these circumstances. The second formulation is normative: a privacy expectation is reasonable if we aspire to a society in which people
have privacy under such circumstances. 15 1
When a person intending to conspire to commit murder with another person reveals incriminating information to that second person in
a secret conversation, the question is whether the first person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that conversation. From an empirical
standpoint, the answer might be yes: people normally can depend upon
their confidants not to reveal secrets.' 5 2 From a normative standpoint,
however, one might argue that what a person should reasonably be able
to expect ought to turn in part on the content of that person's
conversation.
From the perspective of the police officer, of course, it is impossible
to take into account facts unknown to her at the time she undertook an
investigative activity. Whether the officer is "guilty" of violating the
Fourth Amendment must turn on her state of mind at the time of her act.
However, whether the searchee is entitled to privacy, whether his expectation of privacy is normatively a "reasonable" one, turns on the manner in
which he is using his private space. The guilty concealer of evidence,
under this theory, is not entitled to privacy in the location of concealment and therefore lacks a normatively reasonable expectation of
privacy.
151. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) ("Since Katz v. United States,

the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has
a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' The Amendment does not
protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those 'expectation[s] that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360)). In Oliver itself, the Supreme Court held that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the open field. The Court explained that
one factor in determining whether expectations of privacy are reasonable is "our societal
understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government
invasion." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178. In rejecting petitioner's claim that open fields merit
such protection, the Court cites both the normative point that "[t]here is no societal
interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that
occur in open fields," and the empirical fact that "as a practical matter these lands usually
are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial
structure would not be." Id. at 179.
152. This is not obviously the case, of course, but the question is at least a debatable
one. It may be that secrets are kept only until there is pressure from the state (or others)
to disclose them.
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Under this reformulation, a criminal lacks a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the place where she hides evidence of crime. This reflects
the intuition that when guilty people conceal evidence of crime in their
normally private spaces, they forfeit their right to privacy in those spaces.
The harm that occurs when an officer searches those spaces without
the requisite determination of probable cause is a targeting harm and not
a privacy harm. Requiring courts to say that a privacy harm was experienced by a criminal like White in order to preserve a privacy right for
innocent people in their personal conversations will cause many to balk
and therefore to craft exceptions that have the effect of "subject[ing]
appropriately
each and every law-abiding member of society to [the] risk"
155
assumed by the wrongdoer in the place of wrongdoing.
Thus, the focus on guilty persons is not a confusion driven solely by
the exclusionary rule. The focus, instead, reflects a purpose underlying
the Fourth Amendment itself: the protection of privacy for the innocent,
rather than the guilty.
C.

IntegratingInnocence and Targeting into the Doctrine

Formulating the "search" question in terms of the particular
searchee's reasonable expectation of privacy has the rhetorical effect of
granting privacy entitlements to people who, based on their criminal activities, do not deserve that privacy. This is because people who conduct
criminal activity do not expect to be apprehended, and that expectation
might even be empirically realistic. It is not, however, reasonable-in the
sense of normatively legitimate or deserving of protection-for a person
to expect that he will be able to retain privacy in his closet when he
abuses that privacy by concealing evidence there. It is this meaning of
"reasonable" that appears inappropriate when applied to the person
bringing a suppression motion. Such a person should not expect privacy
in his criminal endeavors.
The search question should therefore explicitly inquire whether an
innocent person should have a right to expect privacy under a given set of
circumstances. In White, the question might have been whether an innocent person communicating secrets to friends should, from a normative
standpoint, be able to expect these confidences to remain secret.
If the answer to this question is yes, then the next question ought to
be whether the invasion of privacy was unreasonable from the perspective
of the government-whether, in other words, a targeting harm has taken
place. Have the police (or has a magistrate, where a warrant is required)
made the necessary ex ante evidentiary determination that this person has
the decision to search based instead on other
forfeited his privacy, or was
54
(perhaps illicit) criteria?'
153. White, 401 U.S. at 789 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

154. Whenever a person is singled out for a search for a reason other than an
appropriate level of suspicion arising out of pre-search evidence, that person has been
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Although this modification in current doctrine might yield substantially the same results as the prevailing Formalist approach, its impact
would be to clarify the nature of the wrong in the search of a guilty person. Justice White, for instance, was not concerned merely about the exclusion of probative evidence in a criminal case, although this matter was
certainly significant to him.' 5 5 He was apparently quite offended by the
confiidea that criminals ought to be able to expect their conspiratorial
15 6
dences to remain private and elude law enforcement efforts.
Regardless of what an innocent person might rightfully expect from
a trusted friend, the criminal's privacy expectations are his own problem,
his own risk. An acknowledgment that the criminal had no legitimate
expectation of privacy might have helped Justice White to conceptualize
the issues as Justice Harlan wished he had. As a general matter, reframing the issues in this way will draw the Court's attention to the fact that it
is making law that applies to the innocent and that is designed primarily
to protect the privacy of the innocent.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES AND APPLICATIONS

This Article thus far has been primarily a legal-philosophical enterprise concerned with illuminating the theoretical justifications for the
Fourth Amendment, independent of the particular decisions one might
make in applying this body of law to specific cases. The presentation and
defense of the Innocence plus Targeting model does, however, have practical implications for Fourth Amendment doctrine. This section will outline some of these practical implications and suggest various ways in
which adhering to an Innocence plus Targeting model might assist
judges in deciding Fourth Amendment cases that arise in the future.
improperly targeted. One cause for concern about such targeting is that it is often
directed repeatedly at the same people (members of minority groups and the poor, for
example; see supra note 113), and such people are thus subjected to continual indignities.
Although such targeting includes racial discrimination, it is not confined to classifications
considered "suspect" for purposes of Equal Protection analysis. Targeting a person for a
search (in the "improper" sense used earlier) is always a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Targeting suspect classes triggers Equal Protection strict scrutiny as well, a
standard under which subjective motivations might also come into play. See Whren v.
United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996) (explaining that although "the Constitution
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race ...the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (suggesting that if McCleskey had proved a racially discriminatory
purpose on the part of the jury who sentenced him to death, he would have prevailed in
his Equal Protection challenge, notwithstanding the fact that McCleskey was himself
eligible for the death penalty and therefore, in the absence of discrimination, his
execution would be justified).
155. See White, 401 U.S. at 752-53.

156. See id.
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Redefining Fourth Amendment "Searches"

We have already seen one practical implication of the Innocence
plus Targeting model in the need to reframe the question of when the
Fourth Amendment applies.' 57 Under the Innocence plus Targeting
model, the existence of a normatively reasonable expectation of privacy
ought to turn in part on the manner in which a person has used or
abused his personal space. Therefore, the threshold determination of
when a search has happened should not rest on an inquiry about the
petitioner's reasonable expectations of privacy. The doctrine should instead explicitly replace the guilty petitioner with a hypothetical innocent
person concealing legitimate activity and ask whether such an innocent
person could reasonably expect to have that activity remain private.' 5 8 In
addition to creating conceptual clarity, this approach acknowledges the
compelling intuition that one who conceals crime forfeits the right to the
privacy involved in that concealment.
B. Remedies
The potential practical implications of the Innocence plus Targeting
model are not confined, however, to the conceptual reframing of the
"search" question. The model might also have an impact on the structure
of Fourth Amendment remedies. Since the various models differ in defining the legitimate complaints of different "victims" of Fourth Amendment violations, the compensatory side of remedies can easily reflect
these differences.
Take for example A, the murderer who concealed his victim in his
closet and effectively camouflaged the smell, but was nonetheless
searched by a police officer. Assume that A brings a § 1983 suit against
59
the police officer and/or the city by which the officer is employed.'
Currently, the Fourth Amendment question is whether the officer violated A's Fourth Amendment rights by acting culpably or unreasonably.160 There is no avenue for considering the culpability of the plaintiff
157. See supra notes 139-154 and accompanying text (discussing White and reframing
the question of what is a search).
158. See supra notes 117-137 and accompanying text.

159. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
160. Of course, there are two important preliminary questions in all such lawsuits that

often dispose of the case before the "merits" are reached: (1) did the officer allegedly
violate a clearly established rule in behaving as she did? and (2) were her actions allegedly

performed pursuant to a custom or policy of the municipality? The first question must be
answered in the affirmative in order to avoid dismissal of claims against individual officers,

because police officers have qualified immunity. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
638-40 (1987). The second question must be answered in the affirmative in order to
pursue a suit against the municipality, because otherwise the municipality is not vicariously
liable for its employees' actions. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978). If these preliminary questions are answered in the affirmative, then the substantive
disposition of the case turns only on the culpability of the defendant, not on the culpability

of the plaintiff.
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and whether evidence was in fact being concealed in the location
searched. This doctrinal rule conforms to the Formalist model of the
Fourth Amendment.
The Innocence model would replace the current doctrinal approach
to Fourth Amendment lawsuits with one that includes a consideration of
innocence. The plaintiff would accordingly have to prove not only that
the police officer acted unreasonably but that he, the plaintiff, was not
abusing his private space by concealing evidence of criminal activity in
that space. Under such a model, of course, A would not be entitled to
any recovery.
Under the Innocence plus Targeting model, A would do a little better. He would be able to recover some damages simply for the targeting
harm, if he were able to demonstrate that the police officer behaved unreasonably and targeted him without adequate justification. He would
not, however, be permitted to recover as much as a plaintiff with "clean
hands." While the latter would have experienced both a privacy harm
and a targeting harm, A's harm would consist only in targeting. 161 The
monetary value to be placed on each type of harm would likely be left for
judicial development in the way that such matters are developed in tort
62
law generally.'
One practical argument in support of the Innocence plus Targeting
model grows out of this consideration of remedies. Formalism would require that any foreseeable cost to the searchee resulting from an unreasonable search be corrected, if possible, or compensated. This is because
the violation is an injustice, according to Formalists, that cannot be broken down into harmful and innocuous components. As Formalists sometimes say, exclusion "gives to the individual no more than that which the
161. Although Amar opposes the exclusionary rule as a windfall to the guilty, he does
not claim that a guilty plaintiff ought to recover less in a civil suit, his favored remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations, than an innocent plaintiff. He urges the courts to "open[I
their doors to any civil suit brought against wayward government officials, even one
brought by a convict." Amar, supra note 13, at 793. Moreover, in describing two
hypothetical twins who are unreasonably searched but upon only one of whom evidence is
found, Amar approvingly states that "under traditional principles.... [the twins] recover
equal amounts." Id. at 795. Thus, although he posits that innocence ought to matter to
the Fourth Amendment (so that a remedy that benefits only the guilty is not merely
incomplete but perverse), he does not propose that the remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations distinguish the guilty from the innocent in any way.
Arnold Loewy adopts a pure innocence model and argues that the innocent are the
only intended beneficiaries of the Fourth Amendment. Yet he too fails to entertain the
possibility of providing differential remedies for unreasonable searches that depend on the
guilt or innocence of the claimant, perhaps because he rejects alternatives to the
exclusionary rule as implausible means of deterring Fourth Amendment violations. See
Loewy, supra note 24, at 1263-68.
162. Generally, damages are assessed by the factfinder, usually a jury. See John G.
Flemming, The American Tort Process 123 (1988) (explaining that "[b]y far the widest
scope for jury discretion is its power to assess damages").
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Constitution guarantees him."16 3 If we take it seriously, this position has
disturbing consequences.
Assume that the police wish to find a man who has kidnapped a
three-year-old girl and has written to her parents that he plans to starve
her to death. Assume also that the police know only that the kidnapper is
located somewhere in Newark, NewJersey. A mass search of all homes in
Newark would unquestionably violate the Fourth Amendment. Suppose
that such a search nonetheless takes place and turns up the kidnapped
girl, tied to a chair, in one of the homes searched. Current law would
164
require the exclusion of evidence of kidnapping found at the location.
On the Formalist theory, the basis for such exclusion is the mandate of
restoring the status quo ante the illegal search, to the extent possible. A
true restoration of the status quo ante, however, would include returning
the three-year-old girl to (or leaving her in) the kidnapper's custody.
Had the illegal search not occurred, after all, the child would not have
been discovered and rescued and the police would not have been praised
as heroes by the family of the victim and the public at large. If the Fourth
Amendment itself prohibits not only the unreasonable search but also the
enjoyment by the government of any benefits that arise from the unreasonable search, then the girl must remain with the kidnapper. Although
such a result borders on the absurd, it follows inexorably from the position that all consequences of adhering to the Fourth Amendment are
constitutionally guaranteed components of the individual right against
unreasonable searches. 165
The Formalist's position that we ought to restore the status quo is
problematic even in a more familiar context. Recall the case of A (deodorizing murderer). Suppose that A pleads guilty to murder and is then
sentenced to prison. One foreseeable injury he suffers (as a result of the
unreasonable search that led to his arrest and ultimately to his decision to
plead guilty) is the prison term he serves. 166 Most people would agree,

163. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961)).

164. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (holding that the fingerprints of an
accused rapist should have been suppressed at his trial because they were obtained in the

course of a mass fingerprinting of African-American men against none of whom there was
any reasonable suspicion of involvement in the rape that was ultimately prosecuted).
165. Of course, I would not expect any Formalist (or anyone else, for that matter)
actually to take the position that the child ought to be returned to the kidnapper. The
hypothetical case illustrates dramatically, however, why an approach to the consequences

of the Fourth Amendment that does not differentiate between that which is intended and
that which is incidental is unsound.
166. If he had gone to trial and raised the Fourth Amendment claim but lost, this
adjudication would have precluded the Fourth Amendment issue for purposes of a § 1983

suit. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). A guilty plea, however, does not constitute
a waiver of an antecedent Fourth Amendment claim for purposes of a civil action under
§ 1983. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983).
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compensated for the prison
however, that A should not be monetarily
67
term, because the prison term was just.'

It is difficult to justify this position, however, if one assumes that the
plaintiff deserved to retain his privacy in the location where he concealed
the evidence of crime. After all, if we attempt to restore the status quo
ante as a means of compensation, one unavoidable feature of the status
quo prior to the search was the concealment of evidence that led to the
plaintiff's conviction. If A deserved privacy in his closet, then the disclosure of evidence against him was wrong. The resulting conviction and
sentence, then, is rightly a compensable injury if innocence is irrelevant
to the Fourth Amendment.
Under the Innocence plus Targeting model, however, the impropriety in what happened to A is neither the search nor the uncovering of the
evidence, but rather the state of mind of the officer in deciding to target
A. It follows that there is no need to attempt to restore the status quo
that existed prior to the search or to compensate for the consequences of
the loss of privacy. 168 Instead, monetary compensation should be tailored to the unreasonablenessof the decision to search, to the insult to A in
being targeted in the way that he was. This tailoring of the remedy to the
specific right violated resembles the Supreme Court's refusal to accept an
argument that the petitioner in McKennon was entitled to reinstatement
16 9
or full compensation for all of the time she spent out of work.
167. Amar's illustration is a helpful one:
Consider the following situation. Police suspect two identical twins, who live in
identical, adjoining houses. Police search both equally with equal but insufficient
justification. In twin Adam's house, they find nothing; in twin Bob's, the
bloodstained shirt. The shirt is introduced as evidence in Bob's murder trial, and
he gets twenty years. Now, both Adam and Bob bring independent civil actions
for damages. The result: under traditional principles, Adam and Bob recover
equal amounts. Bob does not recover more for his twenty years. The factual
harms of seizure, evidentiary use, conviction, and sentence are not legally
cognizable; only the prior unconstitutional search is.
Amar, supra note 13, at 795-96 (foomotes omitted); see alsoJohn C. Jeffries,Jr., Damages
for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 Va.
L. Rev. 1461, 1474-76 (1989) (discussing the fairness of not compensating the victim of a
productive search more, notwithstanding his increased likelihood of criminal charges,
trial, conviction and punishment). For a similar defense of the legitimacy of confining
remedies to cognizable injuries in the context of two very different bodies of law (antitrust
and search and seizure law), see Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and
Materials 184 (1985).
168. As Daniel Meltzer explains,
[t] he law of remedies does not provide relief from every harmful consequence
caused in fact by wrongful conduct, but only for those kinds of harm for which
redress is appropriate under the applicable substantive law. For example, it is
doubtful that a prisoner convicted after admission of illegally obtained evidence
could obtain compensation in a constitutional tort action not only for the
invasion of his protected interests but also for the damage suffered as a result of
his conviction and imprisonment
Meltzer, supra note 60, at 270 (footnotes omitted).
169. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to A, who forfeited his right to privacy and is therefore
entitled to a remedy only for the targeting harm, C did not forfeit his
right to privacy. C also did not suffer a targeting harm, because the police officer behaved reasonably given the information that she had and
did not unfairly target C for a search.
Under a compensation scheme that provides a remedy for the undeserved privacy and targeting harms, C should be compensated for his loss
of privacy in spite of the lack of governmental culpability. In other words,
truly taking into account the privacy harm as an independent harm might
appropriately entail the proposition that C should not have to bear the
cost of the reasonable pursuit of criminals without some compensation. 170 A strict liability regime in tort law operates in a comparable manner.17 1 When the defendant causes an injury to the plaintiff, the defendant must compensate for that injury even if the defendant behaved
reasonably. In other words, when the type of harm that a reasonableness
standard is generally meant to avoid comes to pass, the victim of the harm
should be compensated, notwithstanding the reasonableness of the defendant's actions. Such a regime ensures that the inevitable victims of an
industry-are
otherwise beneficial industry-here the crime-detection
172
compensated for their undeserved loss of privacy.
This compensation strategy, under which criminals forfeit compensation for invasions of their privacy and under which searches upon probable cause may still result in payment of damages, raises two potential
dangers: underdeterrence and overdeterrence. The risk of underdeterrence results from the minimal amount of damages that juries award for
170. One might describe the search of C as a type of governmental "taking" that is

legitimate provided there is just compensation. Cf. Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus,
Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 Yale UJ. 1335, 1356-58 (1986) (analyzing the
distinction between compensation as a remedy for harms resulting from actions that
should not have been taken at all, and compensation as a means of eliminating the unfair
distributional effects of an otherwise legitimate action, the latter of which is analogous to a
governmental taking under the Fifth Amendment); Madeline Morris, The Structure of
Entitlements, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 822, 847-49 (1993) (contrasting entitlements associated
with efficiency with those associated with distributive justice); Catharine P. Wells, Tort Law
as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 Mich. L. Rev.

2348, 2350-53 (1990) (contrasting entitlements intended to compensate with those
intended to correct).
171. The common law rule of search and seizure apparently operated in a fashion
that greatly resembles strict tort liability. If a constable lacked both a warrant and
objectively reasonable grounds for suspicion, the constable could seize the suspected

person or item. If the constable turned out to be incorrect, he would be liable for
damages, but if he turned out to be correct, his success rendered the search retroactively

"reasonable." In other words, absent a warrant, ex ante reasonableness did not play any
direct role in determining compensation. See Amar, supra note 13, at 767 (citing Gelston

v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246,310 (1818) (StoryJ.); 2 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the
Pleas of the Crown 77 (Professional Books Ltd. 1973) (1721)).
172. See Guido Caabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,

70 Yale LJ. 499, 500-34 (1961) (discussing ethical and economic justifications for
imposing liability on an enterprise that causes injury, regardless of fault).
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Fourth Amendment violations that do not involve police brutality or extreme forms of intrusion. 73 The small size of a potential award has the
effect of reducing the number of Fourth Amendment plaintiffs, in turn
reducing the absolute amount that the government must pay for its failure to comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 174
Those who have the most to gain from pursuing a Fourth Amendment claim are criminal defendants who may avoid conviction and even
trial through a successful suppression motion. Because it is criminal defendants who have this strong incentive to bring a Fourth Amendment
claim, the exclusionary rule might be necessary to motivate police compliance with the Fourth Amendment and thereby to protect the deserving
many-those who have in no way forfeited their right to privacy--from
both privacy and targeting harms resulting from underenforcement.
One possible solution to the underenforcement problem would be
to create a statutory entitlement to a nontrivial sum of money for any
individual who can demonstrate that she has suffered undeserved privacy
invasions or targeting harms. Such proceedings could take place in an
expedited fashion so that petitioners would not be required to undertake
the burdens of protracted litigation against the government. 175 This
would motivate people to come forward and complain of Fourth Amendment harms and would make noncompliance more expensive for the
76
government.'
The risk of such a scheme is overdeterrence. If police departments
had to pay large sums of money to innocent people who were searched
upon probable cause (for privacy harms) and to guilty people who were
searched without probable cause (for targeting harms) as well as to innocent people searched without probable cause (for both), they might
173. Damages may be minimal in the ordinary case because there is little injury to a
person or to property. See Loewy, supra note 24, at 1264 n.156 (observing that "even if a
jury decides in favor of the innocent victim, damages may be so minimal as to discourage
legal action by innocent persons").
174. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 13, at 814 (discussing problem of underdeterrence
that results when only compensatory damages are awarded for Fourth Amendment
violations litigated).

175. Other scholars have theorized about similar ways to correct this underdeterrence
problem. See Amar, supra note 13, at 814-16 (proposing a variety of ways to address the

underdeterrence problem, including punitive damages, class action suits, presumed
damages, attorney's fees, injunctions and administrative remedies); Jeffries, supra note
167, at 1476 ("Perhaps there might be a scheme of presumed or liquidated damages,
calculated to redress the ... injury of abusive invasion of privacy by unlawful search.").

Opponents of such alternatives to exclusion maintain that such remedies would not work
in practice because of a combination of sympathy for the police on the part of the public
and the judiciary and a lack of sympathy for victims of unconstitutional searches. See
Maclin, supra note 27, at 55-56 & n.262; Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and
the Heater Factor. An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 75, 126 (1992).
176. Police department budgets could be structured to reflect inversely the amount of
money paid out in damages by the government for each department.
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choose to forego many reasonable searches in an effort to avoid the prohibitive expense. Such a state of affairs would be as undesirable as the
previously described regime of underenforcement. We would not want
the police to forego legitimate investigative activity as a defensive strategy.
It may be, then, that we must choose between a serious compensation scheme that will award damages to those who truly deserve them and
tailor the damages to the specific right violated, on the one hand, and a
behavior modification scheme that will effectively deter unreasonable
searches without making appropriate criminal investigation excessively
costly for the police, on the other. Because the Fourth Amendment requires specifically that searches be reasonable, the highest priority would
seem to be the creation of a scheme that motivates police to carry out
only reasonable searches in the first place. Moreover, if "an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure," it may be wiser to focus on deterrence than to focus on compensation after the fact. Many have accordingly praised the exclusionary rule, in spite of its apparent unfairness, for
17 7
performing the prevention function more or less effectively.
C. Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Implications of Innocence Plus Targeting
This Article has devoted itself in large measure to defining and explaining the substantive component of the Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches-the right to privacy-and to defending
the position that individuals retain or forfeit this substantive right depending upon how they use their private space. Accordingly, the Article
has divided the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
in two: the procedural right of every individual to have the police behave
in a reasonable manner toward her, the violation of which constitutes a
targeting harm, and the substantive right to retain one's privacy so long
as one is not abusing it by concealing evidence of criminal activity.
The argument in support of this dichotomy has clear implications
for criminal procedural protections other than the Fourth Amendment
177. Compare Barnett, supra note 27, at 947-51 (discussing how police officers'
emphasis on securing arrests rather than convictions lessens the deterrence effect);
Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1032-35 (discussing the institutional impediments to deterrence
as well as contemporary statistical evidence of a lack of an appreciable deterrent effect)
and Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49, 56
(arguing that to the extent that the exclusionary rule is followed, it results in

overdeterrence), with Yale Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural"
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 Judicature 66, 70-73 (1978) (discussing
flaws in data suggesting exclusionary rule does not influence police behavior and
examining new evidence to the contrary); Stewart, supra note 62, at 1395 (relying on the
increase in warrants issued as proof that exclusion has a deterrent effect) and supra notes
98-103 and accompanying text (discussing the analogy between overbreadth and
exclusion, in that both effectively motivate compliance with the Constitution, though the
beneficiary is undeserving from the perspective of the harms against which the

Constitution is meant to guard). The continuing vitality of the exclusionary rule ought
largely to depend, then, on how effectively it works and at what cost to police investigation.

These, in turn, are questions that are outside the scope of this discussion.
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right of privacy. One important example is the criminal defendant's Due
his guilt beyond a reasonable
Process right to have a jury determine
178
doubt as a prerequisite to conviction.
Why require such a weighty showing as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt? It is to ensure, consistent with a viable criminal justice system,
17 9
that few, if any, people are found guilty of crimes they did not commit.
Like the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause, of course,
a demanding standard of proof at trial imposes serious costs.
In the case of requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the cost is acquittal of many guilty people. The guilty individual's ability
to obtain an acquittal because of the heavy burden of persuasion is understood to be an unfortunate consequence of a protection that is
designed to safeguard the innocent.' 8 0 Notably, the saying goes, "better
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."' 8 ' No one
has ever articulated the sentiment, "better that ten guilty persons escape,
than that ten guilty suffer."
The guilty person who is acquitted because of the strict standard of
proof is a loss rather than a gain from the perspective of the substantive
right in question. Another way of saying this is that a guilty person does
not have a substantive right to an acquittal and freedom, regardless of
how weak the evidence is.
When we read a book in which the villain is able to escape detection
or avoid conviction because of the standard of proof, we feel that an injustice has occurred. Conversely, when we find out years later that an
innocent person was convicted and sentenced for a crime that she did
not commit, it is small comfort that the evidence supported the conviction at the time. At an important level, every guilty person charged ought
and every innocent person charged has a
to be convicted and sentenced
82
right to be acquitted.'
178. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993) (holding that an error in
the burden of persuasion instruction in a criminal case which violates the Due Process
Clause cannot be harmless error); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("Lest there
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (holding that a juvenile
delinquency proceeding must conform to the requirements of the Due Process Clause).
179. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 ("It is critical that the moral force of the criminal
law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned.").
180. As Amar maintains, " [t] he deep logic of the criminal procedure provisions of the
Bill of Rights is not to protect truly guilty defendants-especially those who have
committed violent crimes-from conviction, but primarily to protect truly innocent
defendants from erroneous conviction." Amar, supra note 13, at 790 n.125 (emphasis
omitted).
181. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *352.
182. In the death penalty context, by analogy, a majority of the Court has agreed with
the proposition that a person who is actually innocent has a constitutional right not to be
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Yet the guilty person who is convicted on insufficient evidence, despite his guilt, has still been deprived of something important. He has
suffered a harm akin to the targeting harm in the area of the Fourth
Amendment. In other words, he has been treated in a certain way without adequate justification on the part of the actor.
The actor-the jury or the judge-who convicts the defendant without proof beyond a reasonable doubt has not merely created a risk for
the innocent but has also failed to treat the particular individual on trial
properly. Mob justice is wrong, for example, even when directed against
a murderer, both because of the risk such action creates for innocent
people and because of the failure to establish (through a trial) that the
putative criminal is guilty.
Though the killer does not deserve to be free of punishment, he has
still suffered the harm of being punished without a procedurally sound
determination of his guilt. This is a harm from the perspective of the
Due Process Clause, just as there is a harm from the perspective of the
Fourth Amendment in the analogous search case.
What makes the Fourth Amendment a matter of special concern in
terms of the substantive/procedural dichotomy is the fact that the guilty
are so prominent in litigating privacy violations. The public tends to focus less on the standard of proof at a criminal trial than on the idea that
everyone is "innocent until proven guilty." Though the public is sometimes made aware of a person's guilt after he has been acquitted or convicted of a lesser charge, this is rare. Once a person is charged with a
crime, the evidence presented to the jury will normally not be supplemented for public consumption after the trial. Therefore, though there
are undoubtedly guilty people who are acquitted by virtue of the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard, we are not specifically aware of who most
of them are.
In the area of the Fourth Amendment, by contrast, we are constantly
faced with the costs, because it is individuals against whom evidence is
found who bring (sometimes successful) suppression motions.' 8 3 There
executed. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1998) (O'Connor, J., joined by

Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 431 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.,
dissenting).

183. Unlike the remedy for the deprivation of some rights, nothing captures the
imagination or raises anger to the same extent as the exclusion of incriminating
evidence-the bloody knife or the dead body that lets the bad guys "get off on a
technicality." See Amar, supra note 13, at 799 ("In the popular mind, the [Fourth]

Amendment has lost its luster and become associated with criminals getting off on crummy
technicalities."); Stewart, supra note 62, at 1393 (discussing how the most common
criticism of the exclusionary rule is that "[i]t deprives the courts of reliable, often direct,

evidence and thereby results in the freeing of persons guilty of crimes-sometimes crimes
that shock and horrify the entire community") (footnotes omitted); Thomas & Pollack,
supra note 13, at 147 (arguing that "[t]he possibility of these 'erroneous acquittals' [that

result from the application of the exclusionary rule] may cause courts to twist the facts and
doctrine to avoid finding Fourth Amendment violations") (footnotes omitted).
HeinOnline -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1524 1996

1996]

9NNOCE NCE, PRIVACY AND TARGETING

1525

is therefore a danger peculiar to the Fourth Amendment that the public
will confound substance and procedure and become cynical about the
right to privacy itself. For this reason, it is important to acknowledge the
dual nature of the Fourth Amendment entitlement.
The public's intuition that the guilty do not deserve privacy can be
vindicated by the language of the law, even as the freedom of the guilty
from unreasonable searches is protected. Though it may be better for
ten guilty people to evade detection than for one innocent person to be
searched, we must hold on to all the ideals of the Fourth Amendment
even as we unavoidably must balance them against each other: that all
the innocent enjoy their privacy, that all criminal behavior be detected,
and that no individual be targeted for improper reasons.
CONCLUSION

The purpose and utility of the Fourth Amendment often become
submerged in the controversies that rage about guilty people "getting off
on technicalities." Those who care most deeply about the Fourth Amendment are viewed by many as being primarily concerned with protecting
the privacy rights of criminal defendants, regardless of guilt or
innocence.
This Article has argued that the occasional benefits that compliance
with the Fourth Amendment confers upon the guilty should be understood as an incidental burden imposed on society by our lack of perfect
searching tools rather than as an intended consequence of the Fourth
Amendment. From the perspective of the Fourth Amendment, it is a
harm whenever an innocent person is searched, and it is costly whenever
a guilty person harboring evidence is not searched. These are the substantive values that animate the Fourth Amendment.
Viewed ex ante through the eyes of a government lacking perfect information, however, the guilty are on the same plane as the innocent.
Every person has a right not to be targeted without justification. The
Fourth Amendment includes not only the right of the innocent to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, but the right of all
people to be treated fairly and hence to be searched and perhaps punished because the government knows (to some set level of certainty) that
they deserve to be searched and punished.
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